特朗普试图扼杀伊朗经济，而这取决于中国是否合作
An ‘Economic D-Day’ That Must Overcome a Troubled History
DAVID E. SANGER
2026年8月25日
在周一宣布“经济弃儿行动”时，特朗普政府表示，该行动将切断所有向德黑兰输送资金的交易。
在周一宣布“经济弃儿行动”时，特朗普政府表示，该行动将切断所有向德黑兰输送资金的交易。 Doug Mills/The New York Times
In declaring a new “economic D-Day” for Iran on Monday, President Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent are reaching for yet another strategy to grope their way out of a military adventure gone wrong. Along the way they are reversing the usual approach to coercing adversaries to bend to American will.
周一，特朗普总统和财政部长斯科特·贝森特宣布对伊朗实施新的“经济D日”，再一次试图在一场失败的军事冒险中摸索脱身之法。与此同时，这也是对他们胁迫对手屈从美国意志的惯常手段的一次背离。
Ordinarily, Washington approaches a problem like dismantling Iran’s nuclear program with straightforward diplomacy. If that goes nowhere, officials mix in escalating economic sanctions, adding an element of coercion. Military action is a last resort, and only if the president determines that risking American lives is worth the possible benefit.
通常，华盛顿在处理像废止伊朗核计划这样的问题时，会先采用直截了当的外交途径。若外交无果，官员们便会逐步升级经济制裁，加入一层威胁的意味。军事行动是最后手段，且仅在总统认定让美国人冒生命危险可能带来足够收益时才会动用。
But Mr. Trump leaped from a brief round of diplomacy straight to bombing runs, meant to force the country to give up its stockpiles of 11 tons of enriched uranium — including a batch that was nearly bomb-ready — and perhaps collapse the government. The attacks failed at both objectives, at the cost of 18 American lives, hundreds or thousands of Iranians dead, and a price tag that independent analysts put at over $100 billion, though the Pentagon’s estimates are lower.
但特朗普在经过一段短暂的外交往来之后，直接跳到了轰炸这一步，意在迫使伊朗放弃其11吨浓缩铀储备——其中一部分接近武器级——也许还能推翻该国政府。这两项目标均未达成，却付出了18名美国人丧生、成百上千伊朗人死亡的代价，此外独立分析人士估算总花费超过1000亿美元，尽管五角大楼的估计没这么高。
And only now are Mr. Trump and Mr. Bessent trying one more grand experiment, named Operation Economic Outcast, that the White House described as “an unprecedented campaign to sever every remaining economic lifeline sustaining the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
直到现在，特朗普和贝森特才尝试又一项宏大试验，名为“经济弃儿行动”，白宫称其为“一场前所未有的运动，旨在切断维系伊朗伊斯兰共和国的每一条经济生命线”。
The plan is not implausible. As described by Mr. Bessent, it involves choking off every last transaction that funnels money to Tehran, whether it is well-disguised digital transactions, or ship-to-ship transfers of oil, or the movement of gold around the globe. “This is a sustained operation to collapse every last option for Iran,” Mr. Bessent, who has become the public face of the effort at economic strangulation said at a news conference at the Treasury on Monday.
该计划并非不切实际。正如贝森特所述，它涉及截断所有向德黑兰输送资金的交易，无论是有妥善伪装的数字交易、船对船的石油转运，还是全球范围内的黄金流动。贝森特周一在财政部新闻发布会上表示：“这是一项持续行动，旨在摧毁伊朗的所有选项。”他已成为这场经济扼杀行动的形象代言人。
But the effort raises a series of questions that the White House has not answered. First among them is why, if sanctions as airtight as these are possible, they were not employed before Mr. Trump ordered the U.S. military into battle, exposing shortages of key munitions and the limits of American military power? And now that the military has, in Mr. Bessent’s words, “laid the groundwork” for success, what about China — which purchased more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2025? Is the administration willing to risk another direct confrontation with Beijing, with which it is already at odds over artificial intelligence, Taiwan, a rapid nuclear expansion and a huge production overhang that threatens the global economy?
但此举引发了一系列白宫尚未回答的问题。首先，如果如此严密的制裁可行，为何不在特朗普命令美军开战之前采用？这场战斗暴露了关键弹药短缺和美国军力的局限。其次，既然军方已如贝森特所言“奠定了基础”，那么中国呢——2025年中国购买了伊朗超过80%的石油出口。美国政府是否愿意冒险与北京再次直接对抗？双方在人工智能、台湾问题、快速核扩张以及威胁全球经济的巨大产能过剩等方面已存在分歧。
The original D-Day, on the shores of Normandy, did not require Chinese participation. This economic D-Day does, and there is no indication so far that it is forthcoming, a month before President Xi Jinping is scheduled to arrive in Washington for his first state visit in more than a decade.
在诺曼底海岸上的原版D日并不需要中国参与。而这次经济D日需要，但目前没有任何迹象表明中国会配合，而此时距离中国国家主席习近平计划抵达华盛顿进行十多年来首次国事访问仅剩一个月。
“This will be tricky,” Peter Harrell, a visiting scholar at Georgetown Law School who has written extensively on the limits of economic sanctions, said on Monday.
“这将很棘手，”乔治城大学法学院访问学者彼得·哈雷尔周一表示，他就经济制裁的局限性写了大量文章。
上月在德黑兰塔吉里什集市附近。财政部长斯科特·贝森特已威胁对所有继续与伊朗做生意的国家实施所谓的“次级制裁”。
上月在德黑兰塔吉里什集市附近。财政部长斯科特·贝森特已威胁对所有继续与伊朗做生意的国家实施所谓的“次级制裁”。 Arash Khamooshi/Polaris for The New York Times
Earlier this year, in deciding how to bring Iran to its knees, Mr. Trump “had a choice to really come down hard on the Chinese, which he didn’t want to do because of his own economic agenda with Xi, or put the naval blockade on the Iranian tankers,” Mr. Harrell noted.
哈雷尔指出，今年早些时候，在决定如何让伊朗屈服时，特朗普“曾有两个选择：一是真正对中国下重手施压，但由于他与习近平的经济议程，他不想这么做；二是对伊朗油轮实施海上封锁”。
“It turned out it was politically easier to put the blockade on all the Iranian tanks than to tell the Chinese ‘We will sanction your big companies’ if they continued their trade with Iran.”
“结果看来，对伊朗油轮实施封锁在政治上要比告诉中国‘再和伊朗贸易，我们就制裁你们的大公司’容易一些。”
It is still a delicate issue. Mr. Bessent threatened what are called “secondary sanctions” on all nations that continued to do business with Iran.
这仍是一个微妙问题。贝森特威胁对所有继续与伊朗做生意的国家实施所谓“次级制裁”。
But in an opinion article for The Financial Times over the weekend and at his news conference on Monday, Mr. Bessent never uttered the word “China.” He was going out of his way to avoid angering the world’s second-largest economy, and the one nation that may well determine whether this new White House strategy has a chance.
但在周末为《金融时报》撰写的评论文章以及周一的新闻发布会上，贝森特始终没有提及“中国”一词。他正刻意避免激怒世界第二大经济体，而中国恰恰是可能决定白宫这一新战略成败的国家。
Of course, there is nothing new in trying to make Iran an economic outcast. The first serious efforts to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program date back to the George W. Bush administration. When the Obama administration was trying to push Iran into negotiations in 2009, the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton, promised “crippling sanctions” unless the country entered negotiations.
当然，试图让伊朗成为经济弃儿并非新鲜事。最早真正动手对伊朗核计划实施制裁的是小布什政府。2009年奥巴马政府试图推动伊朗进行谈判时，时任国务卿希拉里·罗德姆·克林顿曾承诺，除非伊朗进入谈判，否则将实施“毁灭性制裁”。
It took years to generate results, but many experts contend that the escalating sanctions that followed helped compel Iran to agree to the 2015 nuclear accord, sharply limiting its nuclear work in return for a lifting of financial and oil sanctions. Mr. Trump ripped up that agreement in 2018, declaring it deeply flawed.
尽管花费数年才见成效，但许多专家认为，随后逐步升级的制裁有助于迫使伊朗同意2015年核协议，该协议大幅限制伊朗核活动，以换取金融和石油制裁的解除。特朗普于2018年撕毁该协议，宣称其存在严重缺陷。
At that time, he began reimposing sanctions, and he and his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, predicted that the economic pressure would be too much for Iran’s leaders to take.
那时，他开始重新实施制裁，他和时任国务卿迈克·庞皮欧预测，经济压力将让伊朗领导人难以承受。
“The Trump administration is pursuing a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign designed to choke off revenues that the regime — and particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, part of Iran’s military that is directly beholden to the Supreme Leader — uses to fund violence,’’ Mr. Pompeo wrote in Foreign Affairs in late 2018. “Yet President Trump does not want another long-term U.S. military engagement in the Middle East.”
“特朗普政府正在推行‘极限施压’，旨在切断该政权——特别是伊斯兰革命卫队（伊朗军队中直接听命于最高领袖的一部分）——用于资助暴力活动的收入，”庞皮欧于2018年底在《外交事务》中写道。“然而，特朗普总统不希望美国在中东再有长期军事介入。”
Mr. Pompeo, now estranged from Mr. Trump, sounded many of the themes repeated by Mr. Bessent on Monday. The exception is that the United States is now committed to a military presence off Iran’s coast for an indeterminate amount of time, but certainly as long as Iran threatens shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
如今与特朗普疏远的庞皮欧当时提出的许多主题周一又被贝森特提及。不同之处在于，美国现在已在伊朗海岸外维持军事存在，且不知何时能结束——只要伊朗还在威胁霍尔木兹海峡航运，这种存在就会持续。
The record of these past sanctions is unimpressive: Iran kept shipping two million to three million barrels of oil a day despite them. Those numbers have now come down to a trickle, thanks to the naval blockade now in place.
此前的制裁成效上乏善可陈：伊朗仍每天出口200万至300万桶石油。如今，由于海上封锁，这个数字已经降到很低。
But the nuclear material has not moved out of its rubble-covered storage sites since the United States bombed those areas in June 2025, satellite photographs indicate. And the government survives, though under different management after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes of the war in February. His son, considered more of a hard-liner, now holds the post, even though he has not been seen or heard from directly.
但自2025年6月美国轰炸以来，卫星照片显示核材料并未从覆满瓦砾的储存设施移出。政府仍在运转，尽管在2月战争首轮袭击中阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊被击毙后，领导层已变更。现已继任的哈梅内伊之子被认为更为强硬，尽管他本人尚未公开露面或发声。
贝森特周一在财政部。他已成为美国对伊朗的经济扼杀行动的形象代言人。
贝森特周一在财政部。他已成为美国对伊朗的经济扼杀行动的形象代言人。 Julia Demaree Nikhinson/Associated Press
As a result, one of the more curious elements of Mr. Bessent’s speech on Monday came when he returned to a promise made by Mr. Trump nearly six months ago: that he would establish the conditions for regime change.
因此，贝森特周一讲话中格外奇怪的一点是，他重提了特朗普近六个月前的承诺：为政权更迭创造条件。
At the time, Mr. Trump thought the military battle would last a few days or weeks, before Iran offered what the president called “unconditional surrender.” He urged the Iranian people to rise up, and take over their government, after the smoke of the American bombing cleared. Mr. Trump soon abandoned that effort, acknowledging in an interview with The New York Times in June that the Iranian people simply did not have the guns or organization to make that happen.
当时，特朗普以为军事行动只会持续数天或数周，之后伊朗便会提出他所称的“无条件投降”。他敦促伊朗人民在美国轰炸的硝烟散去后奋起接管政府。但特朗普很快放弃了这一努力，在6月接受《纽约时报》采访时承认，伊朗人民根本没有武器或组织来实现这一目标。
Mr. Bessent tried a slightly different approach on Monday.
贝森特周一尝试了略有不同的方式。
“To the ordinary soldiers supporting this regime,” Mr. Bessent said, “as more and more of your paychecks stop or are supposedly just delayed, ask whether your commanders are leading your country to triumph or to ruin, and recall that the Berlin Wall fell when ordinary soldiers decided not to shoot at their own people.”
“致支持这个政权的普通士兵，”贝森特说，“当你们的薪水越来越多地停发或被告知只是延迟时，问问你们的指挥官，是带领国家走向胜利还是毁灭，并回想柏林墙倒塌之时，正是普通士兵决定不对自己人民开枪的时刻。”
Of course, the circumstances when the wall fell were entirely different than they are in Iran. There was no external, active war going on, just the accelerating pressure of the Cold War. And the Soviet Union and its satellites saw little hope in putting down the local uprisings, including the one in East Germany that led to Mr. Bessent’s historical analogy.
柏林墙的倒塌当然是和伊朗截然不同的情形。当时没有外部正在进行的热战，只有冷战加速的压力。苏联及其卫星国对镇压当地起义（包括促成了贝森特提及的柏林墙倒塌的那场东德起义）几乎不抱希望。
Yet that is Mr. Trump’s big bet right now. His decision in February to forgo the kind of sanctions announced on Monday, and to move right to military force, was in some ways an acknowledgment that economic sanctions move slowly, and that history suggests they often fail to work.
然而，这正是特朗普眼下的大赌注。他在2月决定放弃周一宣布的那种制裁，直接转向军事力量，在某种程度上是承认经济制裁见效缓慢，且历史表明它们往往失败。
Today, he is back to that plan, for absence of many other viable choices.
如今，由于缺乏其他可行选择，他又回到了这个计划。
David E. Sanger报道特朗普政府和一系列国家安全问题。他在时报任职超过40年，著有四本关于美国国家安全挑战的书。
翻译：纽约时报中文网
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