Friday, August 21, 2026

赵元任全同音字文章

赵元任全同音字文章
中国著名语言学家[赵元任]创作的《施氏食狮史》和《季姬击鸡记》是全同音字文章(同音文)的代表作。这两篇奇文分别用单一的普通话发音“shī”和“jī”(声母韵母完全相同,仅声调有别)贯穿全文,用来证明在汉字拉丁化或拼音化讨论中,完全依靠同音字在实际口语中根本无法表意。 [1, 2, 3]
1. 《施氏食狮史》(全“shī”音)
  • 字数:连标题共96字。 [1]
  • 内容概述:讲的是一个住在石室里的诗人姓施,爱吃狮子,发誓要吃十头狮子。他去市场射杀十狮并带回石室,擦干石头屋子准备吃时,才发现那十具尸体其实是十座“石狮子”。 [1]
  • 原文
    石室诗士施氏,嗜狮,誓食十狮。施氏时时适市视狮。十时,适十狮适市。是时,适施氏适市。氏视是十狮,恃矢势,使是十狮逝世。氏拾是十狮尸,适石室。石室湿,氏使侍拭石室。石室拭,氏始试食是十狮尸。食时,始识是十狮尸,实十石狮尸。试释是事。
    [1]
2. 《季姬击鸡记》(全“jī”音)
  • 字数:78字。 []
  • 内容概述:讲述了季姬感到寂寞而收罗棘鸡(野鸡),因鸡跳上桌子打翻杂物,季姬急着用竹箕和木屐打鸡,不小心把鸡打死后,激动写下这篇记事的故事。 [1, 2]
  • 原文
    季姬寂,集鸡,鸡即棘鸡。棘鸡饥叽,季姬及箕稷济鸡。鸡既济,跻姬笈,季姬忌,急咭鸡,鸡急,继圾几,季姬急,即籍箕击鸡,箕疾击几伎,伎即齑,鸡叽集几基,季姬急极屐击鸡,鸡既殛,季姬激,即记《季姬击鸡记》。

維基大典
施氏食獅史. 他山; 讀取中… 下載為PDF; 哨 · 纂. 此為底本,未經審校。 《施氏食獅史》者,中華趙元任(近世音韻名家)所結撰,蓋同音異義之遊戲文字也。其源本於胡明復。民國...
ResearchGate
14 Oct 2024 — 赵元任先生创作的同音字文章历来被认为与汉字拼音化运动有所关联,但这些文章的“同音”特质与赵元任支持汉字拼音化的态度似乎存在天然的矛盾。
清华大学校史馆
出生于天津紫竹林的现代语言学大师赵元任先生,曾用同音字写成了三篇文言微型奇文,第一篇《施氏食狮史》,全为shi音节;第二篇《漪姨》,全为yi音节;第三篇《饥鸡集机记》 ...
百度百科
搜词条. 《施氏食狮史》. 03:28. 施氏食狮史. 赵元任创作的文言文. 《施氏食狮史》(Story of Stone Grotto Poet Eating Lions)是中国...
古诗文网
施氏食狮史. 赵元任〔近现代〕. 石室诗士施氏,嗜狮,誓食十狮。施氏时时适市视狮。十时,适十狮适市。是时,适施氏适市。施氏视是十狮,恃矢势,使是十狮逝世。氏拾是十狮尸,适石室。石室...
百度百科
《季姬击鸡记》是中国现代语言学先驱赵元任先生创作的一篇同音文。作者创作这篇文章是为了告诉人们,同音文在现实口语中根本不会出现,从而从反面证明汉字拉丁化之可能性不大。这篇文章共78个...
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Community
30 Apr 2007 — 《施氏食狮史》是一篇由赵元任所写的设限文章。全文共九十一字(连标题九十六字),每字的普通话发音都shi。 《施氏食狮史》 这篇短文都能看懂,可是如果你读给别人听,他是无论如何也听不...
Reddit·r/ChineseLanguage
2 Oct 2019 — 我看到了赵元任(1892 - 1982)写的一个有趣的故事。 原文:. 季姬击鸡记. 季姬寂,集鸡,鸡即棘鸡。棘鸡饥叽,季姬及箕稷济鸡。鸡既济,跻姬笈,季姬忌,急咭鸡,鸡急,继圾几...
Threads
10 Dec 2024 — 《季姬擊雞記/趙元任》 季姬寂,集雞,雞即棘雞。棘雞飢嘰,季姬及箕稷濟雞。雞既濟,躋姬笈,季姬忌,急咭雞,雞急,繼圾幾,季姬急,即籍箕擊雞,箕疾擊幾伎,伎即齏,雞嘰集幾基,季姬急極...

人工智能如何巩固美元主导地位

傅晨旭、黄向国:人工智能如何巩固美元主导地位

https://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/story20260820-9549176?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app

联合早报

2026-08-20


人工智能如何巩固美元主导地位

  签订一份为期20年的数据中心租赁合同,可能不会被视为一项货币事件。即使宣布推出一种与人工智能(AI)热潮挂钩、与美元挂钩的稳定币,也不一定被贴上这一标签。但此类发展正日益增多,并助推形成这样一个体系:其中,全球经济的关键投入要素被定价、支付,并最终回流至美元资产中。

  这并非新概念。自1970年代以来,石油以美元计价不仅增加全球对美元的需求,也为石油生产国带来出口收入,而这些收入往往被导向美国市场。但“石油美元”只是一个范例,而非预言。它表明,当生产、支付和资产再循环相互强化时,一种不可或缺的投入要素,便能使一种货币在全球市场中站稳脚跟。

  AI或许会催生这一机制的独特版本。关于谁将在AI经济中“胜出”的讨论,往往聚焦于构建最先进模型的竞赛。但真正的变革始于模型性能趋于收敛,以及企业将AI融入日常运营之时。届时,正如我们今天谈论“每桶美元”一样,我们可能会开始考虑“每单位计算能力的美元”这一概念。

  能源是这一指标的基础。AI绝非无足轻重。数据中心将电力转化为可计费的计算能力,而这种能力如今往往须要提前数年预订。当Anthropic与基础设施提供商TeraWulf签订一份为期20年的租赁合同时,这与工业企业锁定长期生产能力极为相似。这是供应方对计算需求将持续存在的押注。

  需求方很可能让这一押注获得回报。诚然,尽管许多企业都在尝试应用AI,但鲜有企业围绕AI对运营进行彻底重构。不过,OpenAI的新咨询部门Deployment Company(DeployCo)旨在通过向企业内部派遣工程师,将AI整合到它们的工作流程中,从而改变这一现状。一旦此类系统就位,计算能力将成为一项经常运营支出。

  这引出将强化美元主导地位的首个渠道。如果AI供应链由与美国相关联的企业主导,且以美元定价,全球数码生产就必须获取美元流动性,相关收入将流入一个主要以美元为基础的金融体系。与石油收入不同,这些收益不会先在海外积累,再回流至美国市场。

  但发票只是可见的一层。在它背后,一套无形的基础设施正在形成:即智能体商业日益依赖的支付轨道。OpenAI与Visa建立合作伙伴关系,旨在构建这一基础设施,预示着一个更加可编程的未来。如果AI智能体开始在极少人工干预的情况下采购服务、安排物流和补充库存,支付就必须实现自动化,并具备机器原生特性(machine-native)。

  这将成为巩固美元主导地位的第二个渠道。尤其是与美元挂钩的稳定币,能够为代理式商业提供所需的可编程结算方案。由140多家支付、金融和加密货币公司支持的与美元挂钩的稳定币Open USD发布,表明美元代币已经为这一转型做好准备。

  这两条渠道最终可能会融合。同一条支付通道既能通过与美元挂钩的稳定币,实现代理式商业的可编程结算,也能像处理其他支付一样,轻松地处理计算支付。因此,美元计价将与稳定币结算相结合,将技术依赖转化为货币依赖。

  原则上,代币化存款或央行数码货币也能发挥与美元挂钩稳定币相同的作用。但支付系统往往会奖励早期网络效应。问题不在于美元稳定币是否唯一选择,而在于它们能否率先实现大规模、高效的跨境运作。

  这一基础设施还具有循环效应,因为对可编程美元的需求,会转化为对它们背后的安全资产(尤其是美国国债)的需求。代理式商业才刚刚起步,而稳定币发行方已跻身国库券最大买家之列。

  综合来看,这些发展预示着“能源—计算——美元”循环可能正在形成。电力驱动数据中心;数据中心产生计算能力;计算能力推动商业活动的自动化,包括倾向于可编程结算的支付;稳定币储备则流向美国国债。 结果将是一个将AI基础设施、数码支付和美国金融市场联系在一起的自我强化循环。

  值得注意的是,似乎没有任何政府在主导这一进程。石油美元是建立在官方协议基础上的,而基于AI的继任者,则主要通过商业决策构建而成。云服务提供商确保土地和电力供应;AI公司将模型打包成服务;支付集团构建稳定币通道;稳定币发行方购买美国国债。每一步单独看都合乎逻辑,而它们的共同作用,悄然强化美元的主导地位。

  这对美国以外的政策制定者,特别是多年来一直试图减少对美元依赖的国家,具有重要意义。例如,“亚细安加三”国家一直致力于使用本国货币结算贸易、连接各国支付系统,并汇集外汇储备以防范美元短缺。

  尽管亚细安加三无法阻止美元自我强化循环的形成,但它们可以限制对美元的依赖。关键在于将能源、AI和支付整合为一个统一的战略议程。 由价格实惠且日益清洁的能源驱动的区域数据中心,能够增加当地企业获取计算资源的机会。为代理式商业开发本币代币化结算机制,则将减少对美元体系的依赖,并确保交易对监管机构保持透明。

  对于其他经济体而言,核心诉求并非追求短期内难以企及的全面技术自主,而是在深度融入数码生产浪潮的同时,拒绝以深陷新一轮美元依赖为代价来获取准入资格。毕竟,与建立在外交协议基础上的石油美元不同,这一由人工智能驱动的新体系,并未在任何国际谈判的圆桌旁为各国预留一席之地。

  当政策制定者和经济学家还在争论美元霸权的未来时,AI公司、云服务提供商和支付网络或许早已把它写入国际货币史的下一章。那些希望塑造这一章节的人必须立即行动,否则将面临被排除在历史之外的风险。

傅晨旭是亚细安加三宏观经济研究办公室
(AMRO)经济学家

黄向国是亚细安加三宏观经济研究办公室
高级经济学家

英文原题:How AI Could Reinforce Dollar Dominance

版权所有:Project Syndicate, 2026.

傅晨旭 黄向国

Thursday, August 20, 2026

How China is funding its AI ambitions without US capital

How China is funding its AI ambitions without US capital

By Yin Ruizhi (尹睿智), Technology Specialist

2026-08-13
China’s hard tech sector once relied heavily on US and other overseas capital. As geopolitical tensions closed that funding channel, Beijing built a multi-tier domestic capital system that is now reshaping how Chinese AI and semiconductor companies grow, exit and attract private investment, opines technology specialist Yin Ruizhi.

https://www.thinkchina.sg/technology/how-china-funding-its-ai-ambitions-without-us-capital?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_newsletter

=====

How China is funding its AI ambitions without US capital

China’s hard tech sector once relied heavily on US and other overseas capital. As geopolitical tensions closed that funding channel, Beijing built a multi-tier domestic capital system that is now reshaping how Chinese AI and semiconductor companies grow, exit and attract private investment, opines technology specialist Yin Ruizhi.

13 Aug 2026

Technology

By Yin Ruizhi
Technology Specialist

(Edited and refined by Grace Chong, with the assistance of AI translation.)

=====

In 2026, ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), China’s leading domestic memory and artificial intelligence (AI) computing chip company, successfully entered the capital markets, setting a new record for the market capitalisation of a listed company in China’s semiconductor and AI hardware sectors. This marks one of the most symbolic events in the recent capitalisation of China’s hard technology (hard tech) sector.

The rise and listing of CXMT was the result of a fully domestic capital system. Its core shareholders include the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (also known as the “Big Fund”), industrial funds established by the Hefei local government, central state-owned enterprise (SOE) investment platforms, and private capital. Throughout its development, the company operated without the support of US venture capital firms or major overseas investors. 

Pre-2016: when US capital still ruled 
The fact that China’s highest-valued listed company was incubated by a domestic capital system is far more than an individual company’s listing success. It represents a milestone in the changing relationship between financial capital and technology industries amid the broader China-US competition in AI and semiconductor technology. 

From this point onwards, China’s AI industry is entering a mature stage, transitioning from a model dependent on overseas capital funding to one supported by a domestic, multi-tier capital system.

From this point onwards, China’s AI industry is entering a mature stage, transitioning from a model dependent on overseas capital funding to one supported by a domestic, multi-tier capital system. The pace of industrial iteration and technological breakthroughs is expected to accelerate significantly, gradually narrowing the gap with the US and potentially surpassing it in certain AI sectors. 

Looking back at the decade-long technology competition cycle between China and the US from 2016 until now, the capital landscape supporting the two countries’ AI and semiconductor industries has undergone a complete reversal. 


A security personnel walks at an entrance to the ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) factory on the outskirts of Beijing on 27 July 2026.
A security personnel walks at an entrance to the ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) factory on the outskirts of Beijing on 27 July 2026. 


Before 2016, the global AI and semiconductor industrial chains were characterised by a clear pattern of “US capital dominance and Chinese enterprise participation”. Chinese domestic hard tech companies relied heavily on funding from US venture capital and private equity firms. Domestic industrial funds were still in their early stages, and China lagged far behind the US in terms of capital scale, professional expertise and incubation capabilities.

Data shows that before 2016, overseas capital accounted for more than 65% of investment in Chinese semiconductor and AI startups. Nearly all leading AI algorithm companies and advanced chip design firms had investment from top US funds such as Sequoia Capital, Andreessen Horowitz (a16z) and Khosla Ventures. 

At the time, US technology capital, supported by its enormous financial resources, mature exit mechanisms and extensive industry networks, firmly controlled the pace of investment and direction of technological iteration in global AI hard tech.

2016: the turning point 
 
The year 2016 marked a watershed moment in the competition between Chinese and US technology capital. As global technology rivalry intensified and efforts to de-risk industrial chains accelerated, Chinese and American industrial chains began to undergo structural decoupling. Under political pressure and policy intervention, US capital gradually withdrew from China’s core AI and semiconductor sectors, while overseas investment in China’s hard tech industries declined sharply.

... the Chinese government began building a four-level domestic capital support system consisting of central government funds, local government industrial funds, central SOE and SOE funds, and market-oriented private capital. 

Statistics show that US annual investment in China’s AI and semiconductor sectors peaked at US$32 billion in 2016, accounting for 72% of China’s total domestic hard tech investment. After 2021, major US technology venture capital firms largely stopped investing in China’s core hard tech projects. Between 2024 and 2026, annual related investment in China averaged less than US$1.8 billion, representing a decline of more than 94% over the decade.

As US capital continued to withdraw, the Chinese government began building a four-level domestic capital support system consisting of central government funds, local government industrial funds, central SOE and SOE funds, and market-oriented private capital. This system gradually began filling the investment gap left by overseas capital.

Building a domestic capital foundation

At the national level, the three phases of China’s National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund have an accumulated registered capital of 686.9 billion RMB (approximately US$101 billion). The third phase alone accounts for 344 billion RMB, exceeding the combined size of the first and second phases. Around 70% of these funds have been directed towards critical bottleneck areas, including AI computing chips, semiconductor equipment, and materials, thereby forming a core foundation of the industry.


Semiconductor chips are seen on a printed circuit board in this illustration picture taken on 17 February 2023.
Semiconductor chips are seen on a printed circuit board in this illustration picture taken on 17 February 2023.
 (Florence Lo/Illustration/Reuters)

At the local government level, chip- and AI-focused funds established by provinces and cities with hard tech clusters have accumulated more than 500 billion RMB. Through targeted industrial investment, cities including Hefei, Shanghai, Chengdu and Wuxi have incubated a number of industry leaders, including CXMT, Hygon Information Technology, and SJ Semiconductor. 

Together with innovation investment funds worth hundreds of billions of renminbi established by central SOEs and state-owned financial platforms, total state-owned investment in China’s hard tech sector has exceeded 1.3 trillion RMB.

When this investment system was first established, many overseas commentators criticised it for relying too heavily on government funding, arguing that it would fail to mobilise private capital and would be unsustainable over the long term.

Between 2016 and 2026, Chinese private capital invested a cumulative 520 billion RMB in semiconductor and AI sectors. These investments generated 128.6 billion RMB in realised cash-outs and 689 billion RMB in unrealised gains, producing an overall cash realisation rate of 15.7%.

During the same period, US AI and semiconductor venture capital achieved an overall cash realisation rate of 29.2%, including 37% in AI software and 27% in semiconductor hardware.

This difference in performance has contributed to the negative views held by numerous overseas commentators towards Chinese private capital participation in hard tech investment. They argue that Chinese private investors would not enter a sustainable technology investment cycle under government guidance. 

In fact, the difference in cash realisation rate was not mainly due to insufficient returns from domestic projects. Instead, it was largely the result of structural factors: China’s hard tech sector had limited ways for investors to exit, longer periods during which investments could not be sold, and greater uncertainty over reductions in state shareholdings. All these factors made it harder for private investors to turn their investments into cash.

A new cycle for private technology capital
======
======
The eventual listing model represented by CXMT has activated a positive cycle for Chinese private technology capital. It has helped address the longstanding challenges facing private capital in hard tech industries: difficulty exiting investments, slow capital circulation, and reluctance among private investors to commit funds to technology sectors. By improving the efficiency and likelihood of returns for domestic private capital, this model is encouraging more social capital to enter the AI and semiconductor industries, creating a positive cycle for industrial development.

Local state-owned capital has maintained long-term holdings, conducted very limited reductions, and remained focused on developing industries rather than pursuing short-term financial returns.


People visit the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai, China, on 18 July 2026.
People visit the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai, China, on 18 July 2026.

. (Go Nakamura/Reuters)

Previously, the market was concerned that local government industrial funds and state-owned investment platforms, which had maintained large holdings in core technology companies over long periods, would conduct large-scale shareholding reductions after companies went public. Such selling pressure was expected to suppress valuations, reduce private investors’ profit potential, weaken incentives for private capital to exit, and limit the flow of capital into hard tech investment.

However, leading companies such as CXMT and Hygon Information Technology have demonstrated a different pattern. Local state-owned capital has maintained long-term holdings, conducted very limited reductions, and remained focused on developing industries rather than pursuing short-term financial returns.

Based on data from the complete 2016-2026 cycle, the exit and return structures of China’s three major categories of state-owned funds show significant differences. The National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund has demonstrated the highest level of marketisation. It has achieved cumulative cash exits of 37.2 billion RMB, unrealised gains of 59.5 billion RMB, and a cash realisation rate of 38.5%, balancing industrial cultivation with capital rotation. 

Meanwhile, central SOE and SOE funds have achieved cumulative cash exits of 4.308 billion RMB, with unrealised gains of 105.638 billion RMB and a cash realisation rate of 3.9%. 

Local government industrial funds have taken a fundamentally different approach. They have achieved cumulative cash exits of only 2.886 billion RMB, while accumulating unrealised gains of 972.624 billion RMB. Their overall cash realisation rate is just 0.3%, effectively maintaining full holdings in core leading enterprises.
CXMT’s listing marks the normalisation of local state-owned capital’s “zero reduction, long-term holding” approach, effectively removing the primary concern of private investors.

The primary objectives of local state-owned capital are industrial development, employment creation, and greater independence and control across industrial chains, rather than short-term financial gains. This characteristic has provided private capital with greater space for valuation growth and profit realisation. 


People visit the MetaX booth during the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai on 18 July 2026.

People visit the MetaX booth during the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai on 18 July 2026. (Hector Retamal/AFP)
CXMT’s listing marks the normalisation of local state-owned capital’s “zero reduction, long-term holding” approach, effectively removing the primary concern of private investors. 

China’s current private capital cash realisation rate of 15.7% is now on a continued upward trajectory. As more domestic hard tech companies enter the capital markets and exit mechanisms continue to improve, private investors will find it increasingly easier to realise returns, with greater stability in investment outcomes.

From capital accumulation to technological breakthroughs
Compared with the US market, which relies heavily on merger and acquisition exits, short-term capital incentives and rapid technological iterations, China’s model of “state-owned capital supporting industrial stability and private capital driving market circulation” seeks to balance industrial security with market vitality.

The substantial unrealised gains are continuously recycled into industrial reinvestment, providing a steady stream of funding for core sectors such as AI large language models, computing chips, advanced packaging, and semiconductor equipment, thereby driving tangible technological breakthroughs. 

Over the past two years, supported by abundant, stable and long-term domestic capital supply, China’s AI and semiconductor industries have achieved a series of major breakthroughs. The density of breakthroughs, speed of commercial deployment, and scale of industrialisation have all reached historical highs.

In the field of AI computing chips, Hygon Information Technology has leveraged support from Chengdu state-owned capital and domestic private investment to achieve large-scale production of high-end CPUs and AI inference chips. The company has successfully challenged the monopoly of US high-performance computing chips and supported the large-scale deployment of domestic large language models. 

... the China-US AI race is, in financial terms, a contest between the resilience of their capital systems and their capacity for industrial incubation.

Domestic GPU companies such as MetaX Integrated Circuits and Biren Technology have completed multiple rounds of domestic financing and launched independently controlled high-end AI training chips. Their performance has gradually approached that of leading international products.

In semiconductor equipment and materials, companies including NAURA Technology Group and Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment have benefited from continued support from the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund. Their progress in critical technologies such as etching and thin film deposition has significantly improved domestic production capabilities, gradually replacing semiconductor equipment imported from the US and Japan.

The next phase of China-US AI competition

From the perspective of great power competition, the China-US AI race is, in financial terms, a contest between the resilience of their capital systems and their capacity for industrial incubation. 

As more domestic hard tech companies list on the capital markets, local state-owned capital maintains its long-term commitment to industrial value, and private capital continues to step up investment in strategic sectors, China’s AI industry will continue to strengthen both its capacity to generate capital internally and its efficiency in achieving technological breakthroughs. 

Over the coming years, the gap between the Chinese and US AI industries is expected to narrow rapidly. As the relative strengths of the Chinese and US capital systems continue to shift, the global landscape of AI competition is also set to undergo a profound reshaping.
====



南大校友: 60年有多长

======
联合早报
2026-08-20

作者:停云
(南大校友)

======

60年有多长
 
 60年有多长……60年,两个早年都是满头青丝的少女,而今还可能依旧乌发覆额吗?不能,我,已经白发苍苍。

  60年没通音讯,不知彼此的去向。而今同时参加一个大型母校聚会,一个很多南大人都可能出席的聚会;赴会前我有一个信念:我必定能够在这聚会上遇见当年这位同班同学,她的名字已经在公布的名单上显现。怎样相遇、怎样相认?在1280人的群体中等待相遇的这一刻,是不是有点难度呢?如果找不到,我是不是可以请大会主席代我发出寻人启事?60年不见,这次聚会一定要把握好时机。

  这个傍晚6点是大会的迎新晚会。我刻意穿上一套显得活泼的灰色衣裙,脚上还是一对适合上了年纪的人穿的运动鞋,这几年已经在步行时跌过几次,真是必须步步为营啊。

  我慢慢地跟着一大群人走向宴会厅,同时也瞄向身边的人群,辨认有没有与我分别了60年的老同学的身影!希望我还可以认出她年轻时的模样。

  蓦地,人群中有一个站着的女士,炯炯望着我进来的方向!我们交换了一个眼神,就是她了,就是她啦!60年没见的她。

  我们没说一句话,双手紧紧握着,仿佛担心60年的时光再度飞走。我们没有时间去细诉60年的故事,但是看到大家都无恙,心里就踏实安稳。她对我说的第一句话是:“我早早就站在这里等你,一眼就认出你了!”  

  60年前一夕的喧嚣,园里相思树叶腾飞。当一切沉静下来,竟发现朝夕相处的同班同学,已不是完整的一个群体。而她,也不见行踪。她从猫城来狮城,是否已回去原地?我无从得知她的信息,她的名字却久不久在我脑中一闪而过,如此,60年就如水逝去。

  今夜,我们的重逢应该是天意吧!感谢老天,在失落的同学中,我还可以找到一位故人。

  容我们心中兴奋的跃动沉静下来,再慢慢细说各自60年的故事。

|停云

English expressions commonly used

Wednesday, August 19, 2026

艾米剪辑日记 - 小红书

DeepSeek 生成照片和视频