Tuesday, August 18, 2026
[Enhanced]Cost-of-Living Special Payment between $400 to $600 in September 2026. For Singaporeans aged 21 years and above in 2026 who own no more than one property
[Enhanced]
Cost-of-Living Special Payment between $400 to $600 in September 2026
For Singaporeans aged 21 years and above in 2026 who own no more than one property
日子带着人走
予日：日子带着人走
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/lifestyle/columns/story20260818-9523199?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app
联合早报
2026-08-18
客串篇
日子带着人走
作者：予日
那个周末午后，到一位老友家里小聚。
这个聚会，其实是年前就约好的聚会。当时因临近年关，大家各有各的事情，有些俗事缠身，一时抽不开身，偏偏主办聚会的那位老友又患了感冒，于是时间一拖再拖。等到真的能坐下来相聚，已经是过年之后的事了。
人到这个年纪，相聚不再像从前那样随意，能来的都算难得。在聚会的两天前，一位好几年没见面的老友因感冒而无法参加。
几个人围坐在客厅里喝茶聊天，话题很自然地落到健康上。年轻时见面，总谈理想、工作和将来；如今再聚，却多半是在说血压、睡眠，还有身体哪里又开始不听使唤。
一位老友忽然感叹起来，说：“这个世界，真的过得太快了。一个节日才刚过完，另一个节日一转眼又快到了。”一些老友听了，都点头苦笑。不过，仍在工作的那几位，却笑着说还不觉得时间过得快，反倒是已经退休的，常常觉得日子越过越急，一页一页，翻得比从前快得多。
另一位友人也说起自己的近况。
去年因为眼睛出了问题，他动了手术，原以为已经慢慢恢复，不料手术后不久又跌了一跤。幸好没有伤到开刀的部位，当时还觉得没什么大碍，只是过了两三天，背部忽然剧痛起来，连晚上睡觉都难以翻身。他说从来没有觉得头痛有多严重，自己还是第一次感觉到头痛的难受。
他说这些话的时候，语气很平静，像是在讲别人的事。我们听着，却都明白，这样的疼痛是难以承受的，非常佩服他的毅力！
我们这一代人，慢慢都走到这里。
算一算，从认识到现在，差不多五十多年了。那些当年以为忘不了的事，如今回头再看，竟也只是笑一笑，就过去了。年轻的时候，总觉得日子很多，好像时间怎么用都用不完。到了后来才知道，当时间剩下不多的时候，日子反而过得越来越快。
一个节日刚刚过去，另一个节日已经在前面等着。日历一页一页地翻，仿佛不是人在过日子，而是日子带着人往前走。
坐在那里听着大家说话，我忽然想到，若真有一天，走到必须停下来的时候，希望大家都不要慌张。
过了今天，就是一天。明天的事，就等明天再说。这一生，乐观地过，是一天；带着愁苦过，也是一天。既然已经走到这个年纪，很多事情，其实早已不再重要。能吃得下饭，睡得着觉，还能和老友坐在一起，说几句旧话，已经很好。
时间会慢慢过去，人也会慢慢安静下来。等到哪一天真的停住了，大概也只是像今天这样，把话说完，把茶喝完，然后各自回去。
作者：予日
肌少症阿伯增重5公斤 从一滴芝麻油一颗鸡蛋开始
健康日志
肌少症阿伯增重5公斤 从一滴芝麻油一颗鸡蛋开始
=====
想进一步了解如何守护肌肉健康，可参与盛港综合医院于8月29日（星期六）举办的男性健康论坛。当天会有肌肉健康专题讲座及互动摊位，欢迎公众免费出席。详情请看
skh.com.sg
=====
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/lifestyle/health/story20260818-9501139?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app
=====
营养不足是肌少症的重要风险因素之一。年长者若吃得少、没胃口，肌肉会更快流失。通过增加蛋白质、热量和维生素D摄取，再配合适量运动，有助维持肌力、减少跌倒风险，守住生活自理能力。
担任营养师的三年里，我见过太多因肌少症导致生活品质下降的长者。每当看到他们因肌肉流失而步履蹒跚，甚至因为跌倒而住院，我的心情总是特别沉重。肌少症看似只是“老了，肌肉少了”这么简单，但它带来的连锁反应——跌倒风险增加、免疫力下降、甚至失去生活自理能力——都是我们不能轻视的问题。
每次向病人家属解释统计数据时，我都看到他们眼中的震惊：新加坡有13.6%的人受肌少症影响；60岁及以上的长者中，这个比例高达32.2%！换言之，每三个长者中就有一人面临这个问题。更让我担心的是，营养不良往往是罪魁祸首之一。2021年的一项本地研究显示：15.9%的长者面临营养风险，而营养不良会让患肌少症的风险增加两三倍。
让我印象深刻的包括去年在门诊认识的王伯伯。他的体重在三个月内掉了3.8公斤，虽然体重指数还算正常，但我一眼看出他的手臂和小腿肌肉出现明显的肌肉流失迹象。
“我最近总是没胃口，吃什么都觉得没味道，而且很容易累。”王伯伯的话让我想起许多类似病例。这就是典型的“老年性厌食”——吞咽变得困难、味觉改变、容易疲劳。这些因素让长者的食欲越来越差，陷入恶性循环。
让食物成为最好的药物
了解王伯伯的饮食习惯后，我发现问题所在：他的日常饮食严重缺乏热量和蛋白质。作为营养师，我知道必须从三个关键入手：蛋白质、热量和维生素D。
我向王伯伯解释：热量就像汽油，身体就是汽车，燃油不够，这部车就跑不动了。 我建议食欲不振的他从小处开始改变——在白粥加点芝麻油，把清蒸料理改成清炒，这些简单的调整就能让每一口食物的营养价值翻倍。
我特别推荐他喝一些营养丰富的饮料，比如豆浆、牛奶、麦芽饮料。如果这样喝容易腻，也可以做成果冻或奶昔。有时候，换个形式，接受度就会提高。对于食欲特别差的病人，我也会建议口服营养补充剂，但这须根据个人情况调整。
说到蛋白质，我用修房子做比喻：蛋白质就像建房用的砖头，没有足够“砖头”，肌肉这栋“房子”会越来越不牢固。我建议王伯伯在粥里打个鸡蛋，在汤里加块豆腐，这些都是简单易行的方法。考虑到他的食欲问题，我们安排他服用营养补充剂，直接喝或拌在燕麦里都可以。
至于维生素D的重要性，我解释说维生素D不仅让骨头强壮，肌肉也需要它。由于食物包含的维生素D成分较低，我强调每天到楼下晒20-30分钟太阳，不仅能补充维生素D，同时能打造跟家人相处的时光！
团队和家庭共同努力
作为营养师，我深知不能单打独斗。发现王伯伯有吞咽困难的问题后，我立刻安排他看言语治疗师。看到他经过治疗师指导后，重新找回进食的信心，我真的很欣慰。
我也强烈建议他参加物理治疗课程。“营养和运动就像脚踏车的两个轮子，缺一不可”，我经常这样告诉病人。看到王伯伯在物理治疗师的帮助下逐渐恢复肌力，我知道我们的努力没有白费。
一年后再见到王伯伯时，他的体重从50.3公斤增至55.8公斤，走路时双脚更有力。这个案例让我再次深刻体会到，改变生活的小细节可以产生巨大的影响。一滴芝麻油、一颗鸡蛋、每天晒阳光散步，都能大大提升生活品质。
更重要的是，我看到了家人的支持，以及多个专业团队合作的力量。王伯伯的康复不仅是改善营养的结果，更是整个医疗团队和家庭共同努力的成果。
*想进一步了解如何守护肌肉健康，可参与盛港综合医院于8月29日（星期六）举办的男性健康论坛。当天会有肌肉健康专题讲座及互动摊位，欢迎公众免费出席。详情请看skh.com.sg。
陈昱伶
盛港综合医院营养师
Summary: “The Future, Made in China” by ChatGPT
=====
Yes. I was able to locate the full article on The New Yorker and read the available full text. The article is “The Future, Made in China” by Evan Osnos, dated August 3, 2026 (published in the August 10 print issue).
Here is a comprehensive summary of the entire article, rather than just a short abstract.
Summary: “The Future, Made in China”
Evan Osnos examines a fundamental question: Is China becoming better positioned than the United States to shape the technological and political future of the world?
His answer is nuanced. China has achieved extraordinary technological and industrial capabilities, while the United States is weakening some of the institutions and alliances that once supported its global leadership. But China itself has serious economic, demographic and political weaknesses. Osnos ultimately suggests that the future may belong neither to a Chinese nor an American-dominated world, but to a much more fragmented and unstable international system.
1. China has changed dramatically
The article begins with Kai-Fu Lee, the Taiwanese-born AI entrepreneur and CEO of 01.AI, who represents China's transformation from a technological follower into a serious competitor.
Osnos describes a Beijing in which robots are already part of everyday life, although some are still more impressive as demonstrations than as genuinely useful machines.
China's technological achievements are nevertheless enormous:
- It produces at least 70% of the world's drones, electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries and solar cells.
- It deploys more industrial robots than the rest of the world combined.
- It has overtaken the United States in registered clinical trials.
- Its shipbuilding capacity is roughly 200 times that of the United States.
- Chinese AI companies are increasingly producing models comparable to American systems at substantially lower cost.
The important change, Osnos argues, is psychological as well as technological. China no longer automatically assumes that America is ahead. Many Chinese officials and technologists now believe that their country may be entering a period of historic ascendancy.
2. America's retreat has helped China's rise
A major argument of the article is that China's progress cannot be separated from America's recent decline in international influence.
Osnos points to Brexit, political polarization in the United States, the January 6 attack on the Capitol and, particularly, Donald Trump's second administration.
From Beijing's perspective, America is voluntarily weakening the foundations of its own power—its alliances, scientific institutions, international reputation and commitment to the existing international order.
China's response has been very different. It has spent decades investing in:
- science and research;
- manufacturing;
- infrastructure;
- renewable energy;
- industrial automation;
- artificial intelligence;
- diplomatic relationships.
China now produces more than twice as much electricity as the United States, at lower prices, and in 2023 installed more solar capacity than America had installed throughout its entire history.
Osnos's point is not that China is simply "better" than America. Rather, China has been pursuing a long-term strategy while the United States has increasingly been distracted by internal political conflict and short-term concerns.
3. The trade war did not produce the result Washington expected
Trump's tariffs were supposed to pressure China into submission.
Instead, China retaliated by restricting exports of rare earths and powerful magnets—materials critical to American industry.
The consequences demonstrated China's enormous leverage over global manufacturing. China subsequently maintained its position as the world's largest trading nation and achieved a record trade surplus of about US$1.2 trillion.
The geographical pattern of trade has also changed dramatically. In 2001, most countries traded more with America than China. By 2023, the situation had essentially reversed, with most countries trading more with China.
This is one of the article's central messages:
China's power does not depend only on having the world's second-largest economy. It increasingly comes from being indispensable to the world's industrial supply chains.
4. China's Belt and Road vision
Osnos then considers what kind of international system China might create.
Since 2013, China's Belt and Road Initiative has directed roughly a trillion dollars into infrastructure projects around the world—ports, railways, highways, hospitals, mines and "smart cities."
But the technological aspect is particularly significant.
China is exporting not merely infrastructure but Chinese technology and China's model of governance.
For authoritarian governments, Chinese technology can provide sophisticated surveillance and facial-recognition systems that help them monitor political opponents.
The article therefore raises an important concern:
China's technological rise could also become an export of authoritarianism.
China's message to other governments is effectively: you can modernize technologically without becoming politically liberal.
5. China's extraordinary scientific transformation
One of the most interesting sections concerns Chinese science.
Osnos recalls how poor Chinese scientific institutions were in the late 1970s and 1980s. Chinese laboratories sometimes lacked even basic supplies.
China responded by sending huge numbers of students abroad, particularly to the United States, while gradually building world-class universities and research institutions at home.
One scientist profiled by Osnos, Yi Rao, eventually returned to China from the United States and helped build a major life-sciences program.
The transformation has been remarkable.
China has now:
- overtaken the U.S. in clinical trials;
- increased government science funding;
- become a leading producer of influential research papers;
- developed a huge biotechnology sector;
- produced promising new drugs.
One Chinese cancer drug even outperformed Merck's highly successful Keytruda in an experimental trial.
6. America may be pushing Chinese scientists home
Osnos argues that American policy itself has unintentionally strengthened China.
The Trump administration's cuts to American scientific research and its earlier crackdown on Chinese scientists created an environment in which some Chinese researchers became less comfortable remaining in the United States.
A Princeton-Harvard-MIT study identified nearly 20,000 scientists of Chinese descent who left America between 2010 and 2021.
Chinese institutions have subsequently attracted many of these researchers back with money, laboratories and opportunities.
One Chinese scientist tells Osnos that Trump "really helped us" by weakening America's ability to retain scientific talent.
But Osnos does not portray Chinese science as flawless. China remains behind in areas such as:
- advanced aircraft engines;
- the highest-performance semiconductors;
- truly fundamental scientific breakthroughs.
China is particularly good at taking something that works and rapidly improving, scaling and commercializing it—what Yi Rao describes as moving from "two to a hundred"—rather than always producing the original breakthrough from zero.
7. China's manufacturing machine
The article then moves to Xiaomi's enormous Hyperfactory near Beijing.
The factory was built at astonishing speed and operates with very few workers because of extensive automation.
This illustrates what Osnos sees as China's greatest competitive advantage:
China can combine engineering, manufacturing scale, cheap energy, automation and government support in a way that is extremely difficult for other countries to match.
Chinese factories are increasingly using AI to monitor production lines, identify problems and recommend solutions.
A system demonstrated to Osnos could analyse energy consumption across a brewery and identify machinery problems in minutes—work that might previously have taken a human several hours.
8. Robots and the shrinking workforce
China has a demographic problem: its population is ageing and shrinking.
That creates an unusual incentive for automation.
Instead of simply eliminating workers, robots can partly compensate for a declining workforce.
In 2024, China installed roughly nine industrial robots for every one installed in the United States. Humanoid robots are also developing rapidly.
But Osnos is careful to show that the robotics revolution is not yet as advanced as the spectacular demonstrations suggest.
Robots can perform choreographed movements beautifully, but simple real-world tasks—such as picking up objects in different positions or folding clothing—remain surprisingly difficult.
One humorous example involves a humanoid robot working in a convenience store. It confidently offered to retrieve a sausage for Osnos, failed to pick it up, and then presented him with nothing while pretending that the transaction had succeeded.
So China's robotic future is real but not yet fully mature.
9. The human cost of the algorithmic economy
Perhaps the most powerful part of the article concerns Chinese delivery workers.
China's economic slowdown has pushed more than 200 million people into the gig economy, including approximately 20 million delivery drivers.
Osnos tells the story of Hu Anyan, who worked extraordinarily long hours delivering packages.
The algorithms determined his routes and workload. He sometimes had to make a delivery every four minutes to reach his income target.
The system gradually changed his personality. He became more impatient, anxious and indifferent to other people's difficulties.
This is an important counterpoint to China's technological success:
Technology can increase efficiency while simultaneously reducing human dignity and compassion.
The "future" being built by algorithms may therefore be technologically impressive but psychologically damaging.
10. China also controls its own entrepreneurs
Another warning sign concerns Chinese AI entrepreneurs.
The government has shown that even highly successful technology entrepreneurs remain subject to state authority.
Osnos cites the case of the founders of the AI company Manus, who were prevented from leaving China after agreeing to sell the company to Meta for approximately US$2 billion.
This demonstrates the fundamental tension in China's model:
The government wants entrepreneurs to innovate aggressively—but it also wants to retain ultimate control over them.
Osnos describes this as the "birdcage economy": businesses are allowed enough freedom to flourish, but not enough freedom to threaten the Party's political authority.
The question is whether China can maintain technological dynamism while increasing political control.
11. China's demographic crisis may be its biggest weakness
China's technological achievements coexist with a serious demographic crisis.
The fertility rate has fallen to approximately one child per woman, far below the level required to maintain the population.
The government has introduced:
- childcare support;
- tax incentives;
- housing incentives;
- fertility-treatment subsidies.
But these measures have not reversed the trend.
Osnos argues that the problem isn't simply the cost of raising children.
Many young Chinese people have become pessimistic about their future. They question whether having children makes sense in a society where economic competition is intense and opportunities increasingly seem uncertain.
This creates a striking contradiction:
China is building an extraordinarily advanced future while fewer young people want to have children who will live in it.
12. China's industrial overcapacity creates a global problem
China's manufacturing success has created another problem: overproduction.
China produces enormous quantities of:
- electric vehicles;
- batteries;
- solar panels;
- wind turbines;
- chemicals and other industrial goods.
Domestic demand isn't sufficient to absorb all of this production.
Instead of allowing factories to shut down, the government has often encouraged continued production because widespread unemployment could create social instability.
The excess products therefore flow into foreign markets at very competitive prices.
Europe is particularly worried.
Germany, for example, fears that its automobile and manufacturing industries could suffer the same fate as America's former industrial heartland.
European countries are consequently considering tariffs, restrictions on Chinese investment and other forms of protection.
13. China doesn't necessarily want to replace America
This is an especially important point.
Osnos argues that China may not actually want to take over America's role as global policeman.
China has historically avoided extensive formal alliances and has little appetite for assuming the enormous costs associated with managing the world's crises.
Instead, Beijing wants greater influence while avoiding the burdens that accompanied America's post-1945 global leadership.
Therefore, the future may not be:
American world → Chinese world
Instead, it may be:
American world → a fragmented, competitive "un-order."
Countries will increasingly hedge between the major powers, build their own military capabilities, protect their industries, hoard strategic resources and search for economic and technological leverage.
14. America has serious weaknesses too
Osnos deliberately avoids portraying China as the only country with a dangerous relationship between technology and political power.
America has its own problem: enormous private corporations possess unprecedented control over data and technology.
AI is increasingly being used by companies to make decisions about:
- insurance;
- pricing;
- employment;
- transportation;
- surveillance.
The distinction between government power and corporate power is becoming less clear.
The author therefore argues that both China and America risk allowing small groups of extremely powerful people to make decisions that affect everyone else.
15. The central question: Who controls the future?
The article's deepest argument is not really about whether China will "beat" America.
It is about what kind of future technological power will create.
China's model emphasizes:
speed + engineering + state power + industrial scale + social control
America's model emphasizes:
private enterprise + innovation + individual freedom + markets
But both systems are increasingly allowing powerful institutions and technology companies to make decisions that ordinary people have little influence over.
Osnos argues that technological progress by itself is not enough.
The country that ultimately succeeds will be the one that can:
- use AI and automation effectively;
- distribute their benefits;
- protect people from their harms;
- maintain social trust;
- allow citizens to have a meaningful voice;
- correct mistakes when technology goes wrong.
16. The final message
The article ends in an unexpectedly personal and humorous way.
Osnos meets an elderly fortune-teller in Beijing and asks what he should do to give his children a bright future.
The fortune-teller tells him that wisdom is more important than money.
Osnos finds this advice strangely appropriate because, after spending the article examining AI, robotics, geopolitics and technological forecasting, he has come to doubt whether anyone can really predict the future.
The final implication is powerful:
China may be extraordinarily good at engineering the future, but the future cannot actually be engineered with certainty.
Technology can accelerate change, but it cannot tell societies what kind of life they should want.
The article's main argument in one paragraph
China is rapidly becoming a technological and industrial superpower, not simply because of cheap labour or copying Western technology, but because decades of investment in science, infrastructure, manufacturing, automation and state-directed industrial policy are now producing genuine advantages in areas such as AI, EVs, batteries, robotics, biotech and renewable energy. At the same time, America's retreat from alliances, scientific investment and international leadership is making China's rise easier. Yet China's authoritarian political system, demographic collapse, economic inequality, overcapacity, youth pessimism and strict control over entrepreneurs create serious weaknesses. America has its own problems, particularly political dysfunction and excessive corporate power. Consequently, Osnos does not predict a straightforward Chinese replacement of American supremacy. He foresees a more fragmented and competitive world in which neither superpower completely dominates—and argues that the ultimate test will be which society can use technology while preserving human freedom, dignity and the ability to correct its own mistakes.
My assessment of the article
I think the most important idea in Osnos's article is that the U.S.–China competition is no longer simply a competition over GDP, military strength or trade.
It is increasingly a competition over who can build the technologies, factories, energy systems and infrastructure that other countries will depend upon.
And Osnos makes an equally important qualification: China's technological strength does not automatically translate into a superior society. A country can build an electric car in seconds, deploy millions of robots and dominate solar panels while simultaneously experiencing demographic decline, youth pessimism and restrictions on individual freedom.
That tension—extraordinary technological capability versus profound human and political weaknesses—is really the central theme of the entire article.
For reference, the full article is available on .
Monday, August 17, 2026
Dr. Joan Verniko: Sitting Kills - Moving Heals: Everyday Movement Will Prevent Pain - Illness & Early Death -- & Exercise Alone Won't
Dr. Joan Verniko: Sitting Kills - Moving Heals: Everyday Movement Will Prevent Pain - Illness & Early Death -- & Exercise Alone Won't
Red-crowned cranes
Red-crowned cranes, one of the rarest cranes in the world, in the Zhalong National Nature Reserve in Qiqihar, Heilongjiang Province, northeast China.
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