Saturday, May 16, 2026
海南西餐：在消失的饮食记忆 海南西餐馆在守旧与创新之间找出路
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https://www.zaobao.com.sg/lifestyle/food/story20260516-9038472?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app
2026-05-16
联合早报
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本地海南西餐馆曾定义无数人的“西餐初体验”，然而，随着时代更迭与餐饮业态不断演变，这类餐馆如今已剩不足十家。面对“守传统”与“求创新”的两难，业者既要用美食留住熟客，也须经营品牌形象，吸引年轻食客。
美芝路太子咖啡座走过近半个世纪，88岁老板林道柏2026年3月宣布7月退休，若无人承接，这家老店将画上句点。几乎同一时间，马来西亚老字号海南西餐馆The Ship也在4月初宣布，关闭槟城与吉隆坡各一家店面，全马只剩四家门店。
在新马由海南人经营的西餐馆，不只是许多人第一次接触西餐的地方，更凝聚独特社会与文化记忆。只是，当多元餐饮选择不断涌现，这种饮食形态似乎正悄然步入黄昏。
从洋人厨房走向大众
19世纪末至20世纪初，大批海南人南来谋生。他们比其他籍贯群体起步晚，许多行业已被占据，只能进入洋人家庭当帮佣。海南先辈在调整口味与选材过程中融入华人饮食元素，逐渐发展出“本地化”西餐。
本地最早由海南人经营的西餐馆，可追溯至1925或1926年，黄令琼号召亲友在巴米士街（Purvis Street，俗称“海南二街”）合股开设的海珍高级西餐馆（Hai Chin）。它是莱佛士酒店之外第二家获颁酒牌的西餐馆，前者主要服务洋人，后者则成为本地华人上流社会聚集场所。后来黄令琼与股东理念不合，1935年在同一条街开设美珍餐楼酒吧（Mooi Cain）。
20世纪六七十年代随着英军撤离，原本在洋人家庭任职的海南人另谋出路。其中一批擅长西式料理的厨师自立门户，带动本地海南西餐馆兴起。与早期纯西餐馆相比，海南西餐馆不太拘泥于正式餐桌礼仪，有每日固定午间套餐，价格更为亲民，适合家庭和日常消费。
然而，随着时代更迭与餐饮业态不断演变，如今本地海南西餐馆已不足十家。
西餐料理融入本土元素
在梳理本地仍可找到的海南西餐馆时，首先要厘清如何定义“海南西餐”。简单直接注解，是由海南人创办或经营，并在西餐料理中保留本土元素。
不难留意到的另一特色，是多数海南西餐馆仍延续早期英伦气息，如格子桌布、木质陈设和复古灯饰。另一方面，不少海南先辈曾在远洋船只担任厨师，餐馆装潢融入航海元素。
- 太子咖啡座（Prince Coffee House）
它是1977年邵氏大厦开业的首批租户，曾吸引不少明星光顾，如林青霞与刘文正。餐馆后来迁至武吉知马路加冕购物中心22年，2011年落户美芝路至今，仍保留大量使用数十年的老物件，像是桌垫与餐具。
88岁的老板林道栢与多位老员工将于2026年7月退休，仍在等待有缘人接手店面。目前餐馆进入清货倒数阶段，原料逐渐短缺。老板不希望有过多媒体曝光，以免食客失望而归。然而，这篇报道若少了它，始终欠一角， 只好跟老板说声“对不起”。
▲地址：249 Beach Rd #01-249 S189757
- The Ship Restaurant
马国1972年由两兄弟和股东合资的The Ship，宣布关闭两家门店。不少食客提出疑问：新加坡同名餐馆会否受影响？新加坡The Ship第二代告诉《联合早报》，两者没有关系，如常开业。餐馆1979年由海南人王禄值在市区罗敏申路创办，1990年代高峰期有多达六家店面，现存唯一一家开在乌节邵氏中心三楼，由第二和第三代经营。
▲地址：1 Scotts Rd #03-16/17/18 Shaw Centre S228208
- Jack’s Place
1966年由英国人Jack Hunt在基里尼路开设的酒吧，1968年海南厨师史立谐加入，后来全面接手。餐馆2026年迈入60周年，传至第三代。虽然已不售卖猪扒，但菜单上仍可见一些海南风味，如炖牛肉、炖羊腿、参峇炒饭和鸡尾酒水果派。
▲网址：www.jacksplace.com.sg
- Mariners’ Corner
曾在Jack’s Place工作的史氏亲人，1984年在广东民路航运大厦（Maritime House）开设Mariners’ Corner，2021年迁至金文泰斜阳大道。餐馆装潢与The Ship同样走海事风格，以格子桌布、木色调与船只操舵轮等元素，勾起浓浓老式情怀。
▲地址：Block 106 Clementi St12 #01-40 S120106
- Shashlik
主打俄罗斯料理的Troika餐馆关闭后，九名海南员工1986年开了Shashlik，继续售卖俄菜和海南风味西餐。主要召集人陈业芹2013年逝世，两名儿子接手。餐馆装潢与餐桌布置更为高级，服务员穿着简约背心式制服，上菜时推着餐车。
▲地址：545 Orchard Rd #06-19 Far East Shopping Centre S238882
- Jacob’s cafe
2009年开在樟宜村的Jacob’s cafe，是少数在东部的海南西餐馆。老板从加拿大回流，母亲曾在英军厨房工作，餐馆菜单上有炖牛尾、炖羊腿、羊肉煲、德国猪脚、海南卤猪脚、各式肉扒和和鸡肉派等中西合璧菜肴。
▲地址：Blk5 Changi Village Rd #01-2049 S500005
- British Hainan
British Hainan是2013年加入的后起之秀。创办人潘得立的父亲20世纪四五十年代时帮英国人打工，后来到船上当厨师。潘得立退休后勇闯饮食界，复刻父亲的独特炖牛尾及其他海南料理。餐馆一度扩充至三家，现专注加冷大道工业区门店，各角落摆设具怀念价值古物。
▲地址：158 Kallang Way #01-06A S349245
以人情味留住食客
Silver Spoon、Copper Kettle、The Wagon Wheel、The Borshch、Berkely和The Sails等，都是已走入历史的海南西餐馆。British Hainan创办人潘得立说：“最早一批西餐馆兴起后，一些海南厨师到小贩中心创业，人们有了更平价的选择。加上几次经济不景，影响到西餐馆生计。”
经过数轮市场洗牌，现存海南西餐馆多数是独立经营店面，服务一群多年支持的熟客。如今它们面对市场竞争激烈、经营成本高等挑战，更关键的是原有料理越来越难贴近新一代消费者。
业主试着在“守传统”与“求创新”之间取平衡。Mariners’ Corner第二代史君保不久前接受媒体访问时提及，坚持原有路线让餐馆40年来客流量保持稳定。更改菜单就不再忠于传统，所以餐馆只调整配菜，增加凉拌、奶油和清炒选项。Shashlik第二代陈忠基是厨师，为海南猪扒搭配炸鸡饭球，在午餐套餐推出。
海南西餐馆要走得长远，重点已不再只是食物。潘得立说：“门面装潢要下足功夫打造记忆点，店家也要多和顾客交流，以人情味留住食客。同时，要经营品牌形象与社交媒体，吸引年轻一代。”
现在从高档餐馆、邻里小馆到小贩中心，都可尝到海南西餐，海南西餐馆难免受到威胁。但换个角度看，这其实说明海南西餐早已像鸡饭一样，突破社群与店号界限，在新加坡遍地开花，而不是逐渐消失。
海南厨师改写本地西餐味觉版图
从中国南来的海南厨师，以中式烹调手法结合本地食材，为新马西餐的发展轨迹留下哪些独特印记？
一家西餐馆是否有“海南基因”，最直接的判断是菜单是否有海南猪扒。海南厨师将洋人厨房的饼干碎或白面包晒干搅成屑，裹在猪扒表层再炸。
1960年代起，厨师将原本的法式酱汁改为当时流行的酸甜酱汁。早期马铃薯丁、红萝卜丁和青豆，与酱汁一起煮熟后，直接淋在猪扒上，后来讲究摆盘，马铃薯切成块或炸成条，铺在底层或摆在旁边。太子咖啡座海南猪扒（$18）就保持十年如一日的传统呈现方式。
牛排价位高，炖牛尾早期成功掳获本地食客芳心。这道料理传统上以洋葱、面粉、大蒜、香菜、胡椒粉等炖煮，以红酒提香。来到海南厨师手里，会加入八角、桂皮、丁香、老抽，甚至是中药材，味道偏向甘甜湿润，而且炖至接近脱骨，肉筋软糯。
British Hainan的炖牛尾有故事。创办人潘得立的父亲当年给英国人打工时，雇主爱吃炖牛尾但有糖尿病，父亲突发奇想，以番薯天然甜味取代白糖。这道料理需要十多个小时完成，因此大多数海南西餐馆一周只推出一两天，British Hainan是少数天天供应。海南人擅长炖和焖的烹饪手法，因此海南西餐馆也有炖羊小腿。
海南西餐馆菜单还有一大特色，就是会有中餐和米饭选项。The Ship有海南猪扒配白米饭（$20.90），和午餐套餐供应的炸鱼块米粉汤（$13.90包括汤、饮料和甜点）。Mariners’ Corner的平日午间套餐有海南牛肉河粉汤（$14.80包括甜点及咖啡茶）。Jack’s Place有炸鸡炒饭配参峇酱（$15.30）及炖牛汤配白饭（$20.30）。太子咖啡座甚至有完整中式菜单，如牛肉粿条、猪扒饭、酸甜鱼片、三鲜苦瓜汤。
很多新马食客对西餐的最初印象，是在铁板上滋滋作响的牛扒。海南西餐馆并非铁板牛扒发明者，却是新马“铁板牛扒文化”重要推手。如今许多西餐馆，甚至售卖西餐的小贩，都用铁板呈献牛扒。
海南西餐馆还供应重度烘焙、带焦糖与烟熏感的南洋咖啡，并附上淡奶，与一般西餐馆很不同。套餐甜点是小块蛋糕或装在鸡尾酒杯的水果。
Friday, May 15, 2026
China factor spices up tussle over key part of the Indian Ocean
China factor spices up tussle over key part of the Indian Ocean
US military airbase of Diego Garcia gets dragged into powerplay.
https://str.sg/eeYt
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Protesters outside London’s High Court, where Chagossian campaigners are challenging the British government's deal to transfer sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, on Oct 28, 2025. The government has put the handover of sovereignty over the islands and a key military base on hold.PHOTO: REUTERS
China factor spices up tussle over key part of the Indian Ocean
US military airbase of Diego Garcia gets dragged into powerplay.
With the world’s eyes fixed on the war on Iran since February, and latterly, US President Donald Trump’s trip to meet his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Beijing, it is no surprise that significant recent developments in an area in the south-west Indian Ocean that is as important to the US as is Guam in the Pacific, have passed largely under the radar.
The latest was the omission from the King’s Speech delivered to the British Parliament on May 13 of any reference to the planned British handover to Mauritius of sovereignty over the strategic Diego Garcia military base and the surrounding islands in the Chagos archipelago. The speech typically lays out the government’s legislative agenda and the lack of mention of the Chagos issue is the clearest indication that the long-negotiated handover has been shelved.
This follows from Britain’s refusal in January – as Mr Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu planned the war on Iran – to allow strikes to be conducted from Diego Garcia, which the US operates under lease from Britain. It prompted Mr Trump to attack Britain’s plans to hand over sovereignty as a sellout.
A permanent US military airbase supporting air and naval activity, Diego Garcia acts as a key launchpad to project power into the Middle East, South-east Asia and East Africa.
New twists have emerged since Britain declined permission for the initial strikes. Mauritius announced in late February that it was “suspending” diplomatic relations with the Maldives, its neighbour to the north. This came after the Maldives, led by Mr Mohammed Muizzu – who came to office in 2023 as a China-leaning figure standing on an “India Out” plank – reversed the previous government’s position and asserted its historical claims to the ownership of Chagos Archipelago.
Was Mr Muizzu acting alone, or, as China sceptics tend to believe, also on behalf of Beijing – which has in recent years sought to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean and has built up an impressive navy that makes it possible?
At April’s Ninth Indian Ocean Conference held in Port Louis, capital of Mauritius, the Maldives was not invited. And Mr Muizzu slammed Mauritius’ behaviour as “nonsensical, very immature and naive”.
In the middle of it all a small group of Chagossians led by a man named Louis Misley Mandarin – you read that right – landed on a Chagos island in mid-February, saying they intended to settle on the land their forefathers had been evicted from.
Turns out that Mr Mandarin, who refers to himself as First Minister in the Chagossian Government-in-Exile, is a former British army cook and bus-driving instructor who is backed by Mr Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, which opposes the Chagos handover to Mauritius.
About-turn on handover
Now, the long negotiated handover – blessed by Washington until Mr Trump reversed positions in January – is itself in question.
As the omission in the King’s Speech indicates, the British government, which shifted positions on Iran in April to allow the US to conduct “defensive operations” from Diego Garcia, has put the handover in a freeze.
As they say in Singapore’s coffee shops, how like dat?
To figure out that puzzle one needs to absorb some background. When Mauritius gained independence from Britain in 1968, the Chagos islands were detached and were afterwards known as British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). Two years earlier, Britain had leased Diego Garcia island to the US and the island has since been a key military outpost for US forces in the Indian Ocean, housing B-52 bombers and refuelling facilities, among other assets.
In the overall scheme of American global power projection, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean would be as important as Guam in the Pacific. For the Anglo-American alliance, it replaced RAF Gan, a secret air and naval facility that the British operated during World War II from Addu atoll in the southern Maldives.
Mauritius has consistently fought to get the Chagos islands back.
In 2015, its attempt to use the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in response to Britain declaring a Marine Protected Area around the archipelago did not succeed. But four years later, a referral to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion, gained more traction.
The UNGA framed the issue in a decolonisation context.
A direct implication of the ICJ ruling that followed in 2019 was that Mauritius could exercise sovereign control over the archipelago. Although Britain resisted the advisory opinion – and pointed out that it was non-binding – UNGA subsequently adopted a resolution welcoming the ICJ ruling. The vote was carried with 116 voting for the resolution, six against (including the US, Australia and Israel), and 56 abstentions.
It is at this point that the Biden administration seems to have weighed in with the suggestion that it was increasingly untenable for Britain to hold on to Chagos, and suggested it was time to look for innovative solutions.
The China factor
India, which has outsized influence in Mauritius mainly because seven in 10 of its people are of Indian ethnicity and predominantly Hindu, was also consulted. New Delhi appears to have endorsed Washington’s position. In internal discussions it also backed the US view that handing Chagos back to Mauritius would help add pressure on China regarding its maritime claims in East Asian waters.
Thus pressured, in 2022, Britain entered into negotiations with Mauritius, with the precondition that the Diego Garcia base would be retained by the US for the next 99 years. The Rishi Sunak government had all but wrapped up negotiations when fresh elections were called, and the government changed. The new government has merely completed formalities.
The deal on Diego Garcia guarantees Western security interests in the archipelago are undisturbed for a century. In May 2023, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Verma visited Port Louis – the highest-ranking American diplomat to visit the country in 20 years – for an on-ground review, alongside officiating at a ground-breaking for a new US$301 million (S$383 million) US embassy building there.
Thus, the deal on Chagos is a four-way arrangement between Mauritius, Britain, US and India. The latter has increasingly turned into a net security provider in the western Indian Ocean, even as it rows a far slower oar in East Asia, where it is reluctant to be seen participating in security instruments that confront China directly.
Maldives inserting itself into the picture is the new complication. But in this, too, there are multiple nuances.
Ordinarily, President Muizzu’s claims on Chagos should have prompted diplomatic worry lines in New Delhi and Washington. It would have raised speculation that against a backdrop of waning American influence and the dip in bilateral ties between the Trump White House and India, he was again stepping up to do Beijing’s bidding in a vital corner of the globe.
Aside from the American base in Diego Garcia, China also keeps a watchful eye on Mauritius, particularly its deepening defence ties with India, exemplified in a new airstrip and jetty that the two nations jointly inaugurated on Agalega Island.
The facility operates front-line Indian maritime reconnaissance aircraft, including the P-81. Agalega joins the French Reunion Island to the south-west that consolidates the dominance of US-friendly forces in that part of the Indian Ocean.
While there is curiosity over Mr Muizzu’s positions, neither New Delhi nor Washington appear to be ready to call him out. Quiet diplomacy seems to be the approach India is taking. It could also be that both are preoccupied with their individual issues – the war going badly for Mr Trump and for Mr Modi, worries over the economy brought about by the fuel crisis.
Also, compulsions of geography and New Delhi’s diplomatic overtures have led Mr Muizzu to take a more centrist foreign policy line. India’s willingness to take sides is therefore on account of wanting to keep both Mauritius and Maldives in its corner.
Besides, a key reason it had backed a swift sovereignty handover is now moot. India was hoping that the British announcement, which came in October 2024, would bolster the electoral prospects of then PM Pravind Jugnauth, a close ally. However, the election held the following month saw Mr Jugnauth ejected by a landslide.
What now? The six-decades-long Chagossian wait to reoccupy their land seems likely to be extended a while longer. Mauritius will also need to wait to regain sovereignty over the island.
The already agreed long lease of Diego Garcia to the US is undisturbed in any circumstance, which effectively means little changes on the ground. Needless to say, the geopolitical fun and games will likely continue.
AI: Who Pays When AI Makes a Mistake?
For subscribers
Translated by ChatGPT
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/story20260514-9048988?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app
2026-05-14
Lianhe Zaobao
Author: Ding Bo
The author is the chief technology officer of a local technology company
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At the beginning of 2024, a finance employee at a multinational corporation in Hong Kong attended a video conference. The “chief financial officer” on screen looked serious and requested an urgent fund transfer, while other executives voiced their agreement one after another. Following instructions, the employee completed multiple remittances over several days, and around HK$200 million (approximately S$33 million) disappeared. It was later discovered that, apart from the employee, there was not a single real person in that meeting — every face was an AI-generated deepfake image.
This is not a science fiction plot, but a case publicly confirmed by the Hong Kong police.
It leaves behind a question that no one has yet been able to answer clearly: who should compensate for the money lost? The AI tool developer? The fraudsters? Or the employee who trusted what he saw with his own eyes? If the same thing happened in Singapore, could our laws provide justice for the victims? The answer is unsettling.
Perhaps you feel that deepfake scams are too far removed from your own life. But AI is already affecting the fate of every ordinary person in more routine and more hidden ways: a bank’s AI system rejects your loan application without telling you why; an AI-assisted medical diagnosis recommends the wrong treatment plan, delaying your condition; an AI screening algorithm on a recruitment platform quietly filters out your résumé, and you never even know you were considered. All these scenarios are possible.
Singapore already has some soft guidelines on AI governance. The AI governance framework issued by the Infocomm Media Development Authority, the Fairness, Ethics, Accountability and Transparency (FEAT) principles for the financial sector introduced by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the nationwide AI literacy initiatives promoted under the National AI Strategy 2.0 — these have already accumulated much commendable experience in guiding corporate self-regulation.
But soft law can guide; it cannot provide a safety net. When you walk into a courtroom, the reality remains severe: Singapore currently has no legal provisions specifically targeting AI-related harm. According to a 2025 report by the international legal ratings institution Chambers and Partners, Singapore courts have yet to see any publicly known claims arising from malfunctioning AI systems. One of Singapore’s most notable and explicit recent legislative actions concerning AI relates to regulating election deepfakes and AI-manipulated content, rather than a comprehensive law specifically protecting ordinary citizens from AI-related harm.
A Lawsuit Destined to Be Unfair
The situation ordinary people face when confronting AI-related harm resembles a lawsuit destined to be unfair, for three reasons.
First, algorithms are black boxes. Imagine this scenario: your housing loan application is rejected by a bank, and the only reply you receive is “the system’s comprehensive assessment did not meet requirements.” But what was assessed, how the score was determined, and whether you can appeal — all remain mysteries. In a 2025 academic paper, law professor Chen Guoyao of Singapore Management University pointed out: “How AI models learn, adapt, and generate recommendations and outputs may not be fully transparent and intuitive to users. Therefore, the opacity of AI makes it difficult for hospitals and doctors to evaluate and predict how medical AI will respond in specific medical situations.” When the decision-making process of AI is opaque, and the risks of harm are unforeseeable to anyone, the basis for accountability fundamentally disappears.
Second, no one claims responsibility. From creation to deployment, an AI system involves data collectors, algorithm trainers, system integrators, and end users. When something goes wrong, every link in the chain can shift responsibility to the next, forming a chain of responsibility with no endpoint — and what you ultimately pursue is often nothing more than air.
Third, the European Union once proposed the AI Liability Directive draft, intended to reduce victims’ burden of proof through evidence disclosure obligations and limited presumptions of causation. However, the proposal was withdrawn in 2025, and the EU currently has no unified presumption system for AI-related tort claims. Singapore mainly relies on traditional tort law and product liability frameworks to handle AI-related harm, and has yet to establish a dedicated mechanism to ease the burden of proof for AI cases. Victims therefore still face high barriers in proving defects and causation.
Major jurisdictions around the world have realized that AI accountability can no longer remain at the level of “after-the-fact remedies.” After years of effort, the European Union established the world’s first comprehensive AI regulatory law, the AI Act. Its core logic is simple and powerful: the more an AI application affects the fate of ordinary people, the stricter the requirements should be. Any system classified as “high-risk AI” (such as in recruitment, credit, healthcare, and similar fields) must preserve complete decision records, undergo human review, and provide explanations to affected individuals.
In the United Kingdom, the autonomous driving sector established an insurance-centered liability mechanism: when an accident occurs while an autonomous driving system is operating, victims are generally compensated directly by insurers first, after which the insurance system seeks recovery from the responsible parties. This reduces the burden on victims to prove technical liability.
The Wuhan Autonomous Vehicle Incident Shocked the World
On the evening of March 31 this year, an incident occurred on the streets of Wuhan that shocked the global autonomous driving industry. Around 200 “Apollo Go” taxis operated by Baidu almost simultaneously came to a stop, causing multiple rear-end collisions and trapping passengers inside vehicles for up to two hours. The subsequent investigation pointed to an utterly ordinary cause: a system command issued by engineers to “stop and collect data” was pushed to all vehicles without sufficient verification.
At the end of April, China announced a suspension on issuing new autonomous vehicle permits and required eight leading companies to conduct “comprehensive self-inspections.” The real issue exposed by the incident was this: when AI system failures are “collective and instantaneous,” traditional after-the-fact accountability frameworks are fundamentally inadequate. China chose to freeze risks first through the administrative measure of “suspending permits,” but this is not a long-term solution. The real answer must still return to the legal level.
Singapore’s autonomous driving deployment has entered a new stage. The autonomous shuttle service in Punggol officially opened public trial rides on April 1. Among around 740 early participants, 99% indicated they would recommend the service to others. Every trial participant has, in fact, already become an “indirect party” to this legislative process.
On May 4, the Ministry of Transport launched a legislative consultation on autonomous vehicles, with the goal of submitting legislation to Parliament in 2027. For the first time, the consultation paper systematically clarified the responsibilities of four key actors in the autonomous driving ecosystem — autonomous vehicle technology responsible entities, fleet operators, onboard safety officers, and remote supervisors. It also covered vehicle approvals, licensing systems, penalties for serious violations, and liability rules during testing and commercial operations.
Even more noteworthy is a groundbreaking proposal: in autonomous vehicle accidents, technology responsible entities should bear “advance compensation” responsibility — insurers would first fully compensate victims, and then seek recovery from the truly at-fault parties. This echoes the United Kingdom’s “pay first, recover later” mechanism, shifting the burden of proof away from ordinary victims and onto the parties with the greatest access to technical information. International experience has repeatedly validated this direction.
As a technology practitioner who has long focused on AI governance and accountability issues, the author cannot remain silent at such a legislative window. On May 11, the author formally submitted written feedback through the autonomous vehicle legislative consultation platform, proposing five concrete recommendations: including upstream AI foundation model suppliers as regulated entities (to address risks like those seen in the Wuhan incident, where engineers’ commands were directly transmitted to all vehicles), establishing mandatory “decision log standards,” and creating “collective emergency response obligations” for simultaneous multi-vehicle failures.
The significance of this consultation goes far beyond autonomous driving. It is setting a template for how Singapore will handle AI accountability in the future. Three concrete developments are particularly worth anticipating.
The first is mandatory preservation of “decision logs.” The consultation paper has already proposed requiring autonomous vehicle operators to maintain complete accident records. If this principle can extend to other high-risk scenarios such as medical AI, financial AI, and recruitment AI, it could eliminate evidentiary difficulties at their source — without records, there can be no accountability; without accountability, there can be no justice.
The second is ordinary people’s “right to explanation.” Imagine this: an elderly patient receives an AI-assisted diagnosis in a hospital and is told they are “high-risk,” yet no one can explain which data formed the basis of that judgment. The right to explanation means that the elderly patient should have the right to receive an explanation understandable by humans — not “the system indicates,” but “based on which judgments.” This right has long been established in European data protection regulations, and Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act could also be specifically amended in this direction.
The third is normalizing insurance mechanisms. The requirement in the autonomous driving sector to purchase compulsory third-party liability insurance is based on the logic that “when proof is difficult, victims should not walk away empty-handed.” Some may say this increases startup costs, but I would rather regard it as an investment in social trust. Compared with the cost of public trust collapsing because of AI-related harm, a mandatory entry threshold is actually the most effective protection for the entire industry.
The reason Wuhan’s autonomous vehicles could come to a halt without spiraling completely out of control is that they were still confined within the single domain of autonomous driving. But if AI systems in healthcare, finance, or law were to collectively malfunction, the consequences could be far more irreversible than a traffic jam.
A city can move very fast, but it must know how to brake. When AI makes mistakes, it is often not an accidental failure of an individual system, but an instantaneous breakdown at the system level. Today, Singapore has seized a window of opportunity to write “how to brake” into law. Establishing accountability mechanisms for AI mistakes is what allows innovation to go further and more steadily — and that is what a truly smart nation should look like.
The author is the chief technology officer of a local technology company
AI犯了错 - 谁来买单？
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/story20260514-9048988?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app
2026-05-14
联合早报
作者：丁波
作者是本地科技公司首席技术官
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2024年初，香港一家跨国企业的财务职员参加了一场视频会议。屏幕里的“首席财务官”神情严肃，要求紧急转账，其他高管一一附议。职员按指示在数日内完成多次汇款，约2亿港元（约3300万新元）资金就此消失。事后查明：那场会议除了那名职员，没有一个真人，所有面孔都是人工智能（AI）深度伪造的影像。
这不是科幻小说情节，而是已被香港警方公开证实的案例。
它留下一个至今无人能清楚回答的问题：这笔钱，应该由谁来赔？AI工具开发商？骗徒？还是那位相信了自己眼睛的职员？如果同样事情发生在新加坡，我们的法律能否给受害者一个交代？答案令人不安。
或许你会觉得，深度伪造诈骗离自己太远。但AI已在更日常、更隐秘的方式里影响着每一个普通人的命运：银行的AI系统拒绝你的贷款申请，却不告诉你原因；医院的AI辅助诊断建议错误的治疗方案，你的病情因此延误；招聘平台的AI筛选算法悄悄过滤掉你的简历，你甚至不知道自己曾被看见过。这些都有可能发生。
新加坡在AI治理上已有一些软性指引。资讯通信媒体发展局发布的AI治理框架、金融管理局针对金融业的公平、道德、问责和透明度（FEAT）原则、全国人工智能战略2.0所推动的全民AI素养建设——这些在引导企业自律方面，已经积累不少值得肯定的经验基础。
但软法可以引导，却无法兜底。当你走进法庭，现实依然严峻：新加坡目前没有任何专门针对AI损害的法律条文。根据国际法律评级机构钱伯斯律师事务所（Chambers and Partners）2025年的报告，新加坡法院至今没有出现公开的因AI系统表现失常而索赔的案件。新加坡近年最显著、最明确提及AI的立法动作之一，是针对选举深伪与AI操纵内容的规范，而非一部专门保护普通民众免受AI伤害的综合性法律。
一场注定不公平的官司
普通人面对AI伤害时的处境，像一场注定不公平的官司，原因有三。第一，算法是黑箱。想象一个场景：你向银行申请房贷被拒，对方只回复“系统综合评估未达标”，但综合了什么、如何评分、能否申诉，全部成谜。新加坡管理大学的法学教授陈国耀在2025年一篇学术论文中指出：“AI模型将如何学习、适应，并生成建议与输出，对使用者而言未必完全透明且直观。因此，AI的不透明问题，使医院和医生难以评估与预测医疗AI在具体医疗情境中会如何作出反应。”当AI的决策过程不透明，伤害风险对任何人都无法预见时，追责便从根本上失去依据。
第二，责任无人认领。一套AI系统从诞生到部署，涉及数据采集方、算法训练方、系统集成方、终端使用方。出了事，每一环节都可以把责任推向下一个环节，形成一条没有终点的责任链——你最终追到的往往只是空气。
第三，欧盟曾提出《AI责任指令》草案，旨在通过证据披露义务与有限因果推定机制减轻受害者举证负担，但该提案已于2025年撤回，目前欧盟不存在统一的AI侵权举证推定制度。新加坡则主要依赖传统侵权法与产品责任框架处理AI相关损害，尚未建立针对AI系统的专门举证减负机制，因此受害者在证明缺陷与因果关系方面仍面临较高门槛。
全球各主要司法管辖区都意识到，AI追责不能再停留在“事后救济”层面。欧盟历经数年构建起全球首套AI综合监管法律《AI法令》，核心逻辑简单有力：越是影响普通人命运的AI应用，要求越严格。凡被列为“高风险AI”的系统（如招聘、信贷、医疗等）必须保存完整的决策记录、接受人工审核，并向受影响的当事人提供解释。
在英国，自动驾驶领域建立了以保险为核心的责任机制：当自动驾驶系统处于运行状态时发生事故，受害者通常由保险方直接赔付，再由保险体系向相关责任方追偿，从而减少受害者在技术归责上的举证负担。
武汉无人车事件震动全球
今年3月31日傍晚，武汉街头发生一件震动全球自动驾驶业界的事。约200辆百度旗下“萝卜快跑”出租车几乎同时停下，导致多起追尾事故，乘客被困车中长达两小时。事后调查指向一个再普通不过的原因：一道由工程师下达的“停车并采集数据”系统指令，在未充分验证的情况下被推送到所有车辆。
4月底，中国宣布暂停发放新的自动驾驶车辆许可，并要求八家头部企业进行“全面自查”。事件揭示的真正问题在于：当AI系统的故障是“集体性、瞬时性”的，传统的事后追责框架根本不够用。中国选择用“暂停发证”这种行政手段先冻结风险，非长久之计，真正答案仍要回到法律层面。
新加坡的自动驾驶部署已进入新阶段。榜鹅自驾接驳车服务已于4月1日向公众开放试乘，约740名早期试乘者中，99%表明愿意推荐他人乘坐，每一名试乘者其实都已是这场立法的“间接当事人”。
5月4日，交通部启动自驾车立法咨询，目标是在2027年提交国会审议。咨询文件首次系统厘清了自驾生态中四类关键主体的责任划分——自驾车技术负责实体、车队运营方、车载安全员、远程监控员；同时覆盖车辆审批、牌照制度、严重违规处罚、测试与商业运营阶段的责任规则。
更值得注意的是一项具开创意义的提议：在自驾车事故中，技术负责实体应承担“先行赔付”责任——保险公司先全额赔付受害者，再向真正过错方追偿。这与英国“先赔后追”机制相呼应，把举证负担从普通受害者身上，转移到最掌握技术信息的一方。这是一个被国际经验反复验证的方向。
作为长期关注AI治理责任议题的科技从业者，笔者无法在这样的立法窗口前保持沉默。5月11日，笔者通过自驾车立法咨询平台正式提交书面反馈，提出五项具体建议：将上游AI基础模型供应商纳入受规制主体（以应对类似武汉事件中，工程师指令直接传到所有车辆的失控风险）、建立强制“决策日志标准”、为多车同时失灵设立“集体应急响应义务”等。
这场咨询的重要性远不止于自动驾驶。它正在为新加坡未来如何处理AI责任，定下范本。三件具体的事，特别值得期待。
一是“决策日志”的强制保存。咨询文件已提议要求自驾车运营方完整记录事故数据。这一原则若能延伸至医疗AI、金融AI、招聘AI等其他高风险场景，便能从源头消解举证困境——没有记录，就没有追责；没有追责，就没有公正。
二是普通人的“解释权”。想象一下：一位年长者在医院接受AI辅助诊断后被告知“高风险”，但没有人能说清依据的是哪些数据。解释权意味着这位年长者有权获得一份人类可以理解的说明——不是“系统显示”，而是“基于哪些判断”。这一权利在欧盟数据保护法规中早已确立，新加坡的《个人资料保护法》（PDPA）亦可循此方向作针对性修订。
三是保险机制常态化。自驾领域要求强制购买第三方责任险，是基于“举证困难时，受害者不能空手而归”的逻辑，也许有人会说这增加了创业成本，但我宁愿把它看成一笔“社会信任投资”：相较于AI损害引发公众信任崩溃的代价，一道强制准入门槛，其实是对整个行业最有效的保护。
武汉的无人车之所以能停摆而不至于失控，是因为都还在“自动驾驶”这一个领域内；但医疗、金融、法律领域的AI若集体失常，后果可能远比一次交通拥堵更难挽回。
一座城市可以跑得很快，但必须知道怎么刹车。AI出错的时刻，往往不是个别系统的偶发故障，而是系统级的瞬间失灵。今天，新加坡抓住一道窗口，把“怎么刹车”写进法律。为AI的错误建立追责机制，是让创新走得更远、更稳——这，才是真正的智慧城邦应有的样子。
作者是本地科技公司首席技术官
Thursday, May 14, 2026
新加坡经济策略报告出炉：从三主轴强化竞争韧性 打造AI方案领导地位2026-05-14
在竞争日益激烈的世界里，仅靠高效稳定和良好运行已然不足。新加坡为下一阶段经济发展制定方向，将通过强化自身价值定位、提高企业和员工应变能力，以及构建经济韧性，确保新加坡保持竞争力。
围绕三主轴 针对八个发展方向提32项建议
经过九个月的咨询与讨论，我国经济策略检讨委员会向政府提呈了建议报告，并于星期三（5月13日）发布报告摘要。报告围绕上述三个主轴，针对八个发展方向提出32项建议，包括如何更好地扶持职业转型和支持员工，及提升能源韧性等。
完整报告将于近期公布。
黄循财总理同天傍晚在社媒贴文，表明政府支持经济策略检讨总体策略和方向，并说：“前方的任务是把这些方向，转化为具体行动。”
领导新加坡经济韧性工作小组的副总理兼贸工部长颜金勇星期三在未来经济论坛上指出，经济策略检讨不仅是对当前挑战的回应，也关乎新加坡如何在长远规划中定位自身，以保持竞争力、创造优质就业机会，在瞬息万变的世界中与时俱进。
颜金勇说：“对新加坡而言，仅靠高效、稳定和良好运行已不再足够。这些依然是我们的核心优势。但在竞争日益激烈的世界中，我们必须更进一步。”
新加坡须精准下注 不能固守安全选项
颜金勇指出，全球地缘政治紧张、人工智能（AI）迅速崛起、气候变化加剧。这些因素带来了结构改变，而非短暂挑战。
要应对这些结构变化，我国首先须强化自身价值定位，在先进制造、金融、物流、科技等核心领域深化优势，吸引高价值投资，并把AI广泛应用于整体经济，提升生产力、创造更好的就业机会。
他以AI为例说：“我们不能只维护今天的强项，也要建立明天的优势。这意味在新加坡拥有潜在优势的领域，精准下注。”
他提醒，不是所有赌注都会成功，但如果固守安全选项，“我们将无法突破或发展新领域”。
中东动荡局势凸显经济韧性重要性
在巩固韧性方面，颜金勇表明，新加坡须保持可信赖、多元的国际枢纽地位，并在货物、资金、数据与能源的流动中，发挥更大的协调与增值作用，建立不可取代的关键地位。
过去三个月，中东动荡揭示了全球供应链和能源的脆弱，委员会因此在最终报告中增设经济韧性这个主题。委员会建议政府除了聚焦粮食等关键物资，也须和其他关键领域合作，了解各领域的供应链风险，并共同制定务实的应对策略。
颜金勇也呼吁企业加快转型，走向国际化，并表明会协助员工提升技能，为转换职业者提供更多支持。他说：“我们的目标，不仅是帮助国人适应变化，更希望大家能在变化中持续进步。 ”
为回应国人对就业前景的关切，委员会提出要更好地扶持职业转型和支持员工。这包括为面对失业风险的员工提供职业转型桥梁，以及通过检讨技能创前程求职援助等计划，加强对专业人士、经理和执行人员的支持。
最终报告里的其余建议，大多是对今年1月发布的中期报告所提策略进行更细致的阐述，包括创造更多且更多元的优质就业机会，以及在优势领域建立全球领导地位。
AI始终是建议报告的核心主题之一。中期报告提出要打造新加坡的AI领导地位，以AI赋能经济，最终建议则进一步提出，把新加坡打造成国际AI方案领导者，并建议新加坡汇集数据基建设施、算力、监管沙盒等关键资源，吸引前沿AI公司和人才到新加坡发展和落实方案。
工作变化节奏加快 震荡愈发频繁
我国政府是于去年8月成立五个委员会检讨经济策略，制定长远经济发展蓝图。政府已在今年2月和3月的财政预算案和国会拨款委员会预算案辩论中，就委员会的中期报告作出一轮回应，包括宣布成立由黄总理领导的全国人工智能理事会。
颜金勇今年1月在中期报告发布会上曾提醒，在当前形势下，我国接下来将较难取得经济增长。他星期三重申这点，也指出下来人们的工作将出现较快的变化，震荡将变得愈发频繁。
但他同时强调，新加坡从有利的位置出发，我国可信赖、与外界相连接，并拥有有效的机构、具竞争力的产业，以及政府、企业和员工之间牢固的伙伴关系。
他说：“经济策略检讨已勾勒我们在新发展阶段中的策略。在一个已改变的世界里，新加坡不能假定昨天的优势自动代表我们明天也能保有一席之地。我们须不断更新我们的经济。”
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