Saturday, November 21, 2026

Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1946

Between 1945 and 1948, the Kuomintang government led by Chiang Kai-shek signed a series of agreements with the United States. Online sources often group them into nine documents. Though worded as reciprocal treaties on paper, the huge gap in national strength between China and the US meant the arrangements largely benefited the United States and impaired China’s sovereignty.
 
The most famous one was the Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1946. It granted Americans extensive rights to reside, trade, invest and lease land across China. American goods enjoyed favourable tax treatment. US warships could enter Chinese ports and territorial waters under certain excuses. Other agreements covered aerial surveying, air transport, naval facilities, military jurisdiction and economic aid tied to restrictive terms.
 
Unlike the old unequal treaties of the late Qing Dynasty, these pacts did not include territorial cessions or indemnities. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the new government repudiated all these Kuomintang-era agreements.
 
要不要我再压缩成更短的版本?

九个丧权辱国条约

先说结论
 
“九个丧权辱国条约”这个说法,不是官方史书的固定定名,是后世网络、通俗读物归纳出来的一套说法;但1945–1948年间,国民党政府确实和美国签署了一系列条约、协定、秘密换文,学界与党史著作普遍评价:这些文件纸面文字大多写着“对等互惠”,但因为中美国力差距巨大,实际让美国在华获得大量特权,损害中国主权 。
 
注意:其中一部分是公开条约,一部分是秘密协定、军事换文,部分秘密文件当年没有对外公布,所以不同资料里清单数量会有出入,不一定刚好是9个。
 
流传最广的“九大协定”清单(通俗版本)
 
1. 《美国在华空中摄影协定》(1945.11):允许美军飞机在中国全境航拍测绘
2. 《中美剩余战时财产出售协定》(1946.8.31):美方低价把大量战时物资卖给国民党,物资多用于内战
3. 《中美航空运输协定》(《中美空中运输协定》,1946.12):美国飞机可在中国领空飞行、多地起降,含非商业停靠(军事用途)
4. 《中美三十年船坞秘密协定》(1946.9):上海、青岛船坞长期给美军使用
5. 《中美友好通商航海条约》(《中美商约》,1946.11.4,最知名)
6. 《中美警宪联合勤务协定》:美军在华肇事,美方拥有优先裁判权,中方警方仅能旁听
7. 《青岛海军基地秘密协定》(1946–1947,有报道、档案线索,但美方官方长期否认正式签署该书面协定)
8. 《中美海军协定》(1947.12):美国向国民党提供海军装备、顾问团,换取海军方面合作特权
9. 《中美经济援助协定》(1948.7):美国对华经济援助,附带很多经济、行政方面的约束条件 
 
最重要一份:《中美友好通商航海条约》(1946)
 
条文表面写双方国民、企业、船舶互相享有国民待遇、最惠国待遇;但当时中国工业薄弱、远洋航运极弱,中国根本没有能力去美国大规模投资、经商、航行,权利是单向的:
 
- 美国公民、法人可在中国全境居住、经商、开厂、采矿、租购土地;
- 美货在中国关税、内地税上和国货同等待遇;
- 美国军舰可以借“危难”理由进入中国不开放的口岸、领水 。
中共当时公开声明不承认这一条约;新中国成立后,按照“打扫干净屋子再请客”方针,废除了国民党政府签订的这一系列不平等协定。
 
补充两点区分,避免混淆
 
1. 晚清的不平等条约(如《南京条约》《辛丑条约》)是直接割地、赔款、领事裁判权;这一批战后美蒋协定,形式上没有割地赔款,主要是经济、航空、海军、驻军、司法方面的特权,所以史学表述一般不说和晚清条约完全一样,但认定它损害主权、服务美国对华扩张、服务国民党内战需求。
2. “九个”只是民间归纳版本,权威党史著作不会固定说“九个”,只会表述为“一系列条约、协定”。
 
如果你想要,我可以给你一份精简英文摘要。

AI: In the AI race with the US, this is the one advantage China has -- China's Electricity Advantage

https://str.sg/ojRDP

*In the AI race with the US, this is the one advantage China has*

The Straits Times 
2026-11-21

Yew Lun Tian
Assistant Foreign Editor

Philip Wen
Regional Correspondent


BEIJING/BANGKOK – Rising from a floating platform 70km off China’s southern coast, two giant wind turbines perched on a V-shaped frame stand as tall as a 73-storey building. Whirring at full speed, they can generate enough power a year to supply 30,000 households.

Tethered to the ocean floor by three heavy cables, Ming Yang Smart Energy’s OceanX, which took The Straits Times a bumpy five-hour round trip to reach by speedboat, is designed to tap the stronger, steadier winds in deep offshore waters.

OceanX already generates the most power of any floating wind platform – according to the China Classification Society, a state-owned enterprise that sets technical rules for ships and offshore installations – and at what the company says to be a fraction of the cost of its American and European competitors.

Having successfully passed technical reviews including weathering three Category 5 super typhoons, Ming Yang plans to break its own record and commission an even larger floating twin turbine platform with a total capacity of 50MW – triple that of OceanX – as early as 2027. 

“What we can do is something other countries, including the US, cannot copy or surpass,” chairman Zhang Chuanwei said. 

The engineering feat is but one example of the scale and ambition of China’s renewable energy industry, and its role in driving the massive expansion of the country’s electricity-generating capacity overall. 

It is this vast power buildout that could help China bridge the gap in its race for artificial intelligence supremacy with the United States – supplying the electricity needed to run increasingly power-hungry computing systems and data centres, even as Washington seeks to restrict Beijing’s access to its most advanced American semiconductors.

China generated 10.6 trillion kilowatt-hours of electricity in 2025 – roughly a third of global output and 2.4 times as much as the US.

In 2025 alone, China added electricity-generating capacity equivalent to more than three times France’s entire installed capacity. Under its 15th Five-Year Plan, an economic and social blueprint announced in June covering 2026 to 2030, China aims to add a further 1,500 gigawatts of electricity-generating capacity – more than the installed capacity of the entire European Union. Two-thirds of that growth is being targeted via renewable sources. 

For the US, the constraint is how quickly its electricity infrastructure can keep pace with the AI boom. New data centres need grid connections, transmission lines and other infrastructure that can take years to deliver. The International Energy Agency estimates that building transmission lines in advanced economies can take four to eight years, while waiting times for critical grid components have doubled over the past three years. 

“The US doesn’t even make enough of the transformers needed for power plants and the grid. It is heavily dependent on imports from other countries, including China,” said Wen Yonggang, a professor and President’s Chair of Data Science at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore.

U.S.-China ‘electron gap’

The energy disparity has alarmed some of America’s most prominent technology leaders. OpenAI warns that an “electron gap” with China threatens US leadership in artificial intelligence, urging Washington to accelerate the construction of new power capacity.  

“The US cannot maintain its AI advantage if the ‘electron gap’ with the PRC persists, and our ability to build new energy capacity is trapped in a regulatory chokehold,” OpenAI said, referring to China by its formal name, the People’s Republic of China.

Training and running AI models require vast numbers of specialised chips working together in data centres, consuming enormous amounts of electricity both to perform calculations and to keep the equipment cool. How quickly that power can be supplied helps determine how quickly companies can expand their AI capabilities.  

Elon Musk, whose xAI is building power-hungry supercomputers in the US, has called electricity the key constraint on AI growth and predicted that China would eventually “far exceed the rest of the world” in computing power partly because it generates more electricity than the US and is adding capacity much faster.

Former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt told the US Congress in 2025 that America needed energy “in all forms” to win the AI race against China. 

“We need energy in all forms, renewable, non-renewable, whatever. It needs to be there, and it needs to be done quickly,” Schmidt said.

The “electron gap” creates a consequential trade-off in the US-China technology race: America’s lead in advanced chips produced by the likes of Nvidia may be constrained by how quickly it can supply power, while China’s electricity buildout could give it more scope to deploy larger numbers of less efficient domestic processors.  

Huawei is pursuing that approach, linking hundreds of its Ascend processors into systems designed to compete with Nvidia’s offerings. The strategy consumes considerably more electricity, making the cost and availability of power an important part of China’s efforts to work around US restrictions on advanced chips.

In July 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to accelerate federal permitting for large data centres and their supporting energy infrastructure, including transmission lines and equipment for gas, nuclear and geothermal power.

Both American and Chinese technology companies are also expanding their computing infrastructure beyond their own borders, including in South-east Asia. Those investments serve growing regional demand while also giving the companies access to additional electricity supplies. 

The global spending boom comes amid the growing spectre of an investment bubble due to mounting concerns that AI revenues will struggle to justify the vast investment in chips and data centres, as well as vocal safety fears that increasing autonomous systems could enable cyberattacks or act beyond human control. 

Yet the rivalry and deep suspicion between the US and China add pressure to not let up. Washington fears surrendering its technological lead; Beijing fears being locked into dependence on American technology. For both, slowing development carries the risk of giving a strategic rival an advantage.

The grand stakes underpinning the AI race extend beyond the commercial realm. Such is the known and unknown potential for cutting-edge AI that it is taken as a given that leadership in the technology would likely deliver a competitive advantage in military and intelligence capabilities, and accelerate scientific discoveries. That prospect makes the chips, data centres and electricity underpinning AI matters of national security.

Cheap and abundant power

China’s advantage lies in the potential of its electricity system as a whole: how much power it can generate, how swiftly it can move that power to where it is needed, and how much users pay for it. These factors will help determine how efficiently China can expand the data centres powering its AI ambitions.

China’s electricity expansion serves ambitions that extend beyond AI. Beijing is building for an economy that will consume much more electricity, with more cars, factories and buildings running on electrical power, while seeking to curb emissions and strengthen energy security.

China began laying the groundwork for this vast electricity system long before the current AI boom, reflecting its ability to plan years ahead and marshal resources towards strategic goals. The same long-term approach helped it build its dominance in rare earths, another critical resource in its AI rivalry with the US. 

That planning has also been sustained across successive policy cycles, with Beijing now seeking to harness its electricity advantage for AI. Its 15th Five-Year Plan calls for the “coordinated deployment of green electricity and computing power”, alongside the development of a nationwide computing network and large-scale AI computing clusters. 

In contrast, such policy continuity is harder to sustain in the US, where political power changes hands and infrastructure projects face resistance from local communities. The Democrats’ sweeping victory in the November midterm elections has raised concerns that Trump’s push to accelerate AI and data centre development could stall. Democrats, who will take control of Congress in January, are preparing tougher regulations on AI and data centres, particularly to protect consumers from rising electricity costs. 

Meanwhile, the scandal that forced Jensen Huang to resign as Nvidia’s chief executive has exposed divisions within the Trump administration over how best to preserve America’s lead in AI. And the departure of one of the most central figures responsible for the AI boom has also increased investors’ doubts about whether demand for computing power can justify the vast sums of money being poured into data centres.

On Nov 16, The US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule outlining tightened controls on advanced chip shipments to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, alongside Brazil. It also introduced a licensing requirement for overseas data centres that use such chips to supply large amounts of computing power remotely to Chinese companies, seeking to close down a loophole in China’s access to cutting-edge semiconductors.

“The new remote access rules and other BIS measures will make it more difficult for China to access advanced GPUs (graphics processing units),” said Kyle Chan, a fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, an American think-tank. “At the same time, Beijing is already all-in on its semiconductor self-sufficiency drive, so I don’t think this changes their basic policy direction. These are ultimately bumps in the road for China’s longer-term push for resilience in AI supply chains.”

Driving China’s electricity output is a vast and still-expanding fleet of power plants, wind turbines and solar panels. By the end of 2025, China’s installed generating capacity – the maximum output its power plants can produce – had reached 3.9 billion kilowatts, up 16.1% from a year earlier. The China Electricity Council, a national industry association, expects that figure to reach around 4.3 billion kilowatts by end 2026.

Renewables are driving much of this expansion, accounting for more than four-fifths of the generating capacity added in 2025, bringing their share of total installed capacity to about 60%.  

Installed capacity is not the same as electricity generated because the wind does not always blow and the sun does not always shine. Wind turbines and solar panels do not produce their maximum output continuously. Renewables, including hydropower, generated about 38% of China’s electricity in 2025.

China’s electricity is not just plentiful. It is also cheap. The advantage is starkest in western regions like Yunnan, Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, and the western parts of Inner Mongolia, where industrial power averages just 0.39 yuan (seven Singapore cents) per kilowatt-hour – about two-thirds of the US average of 8.89 US cents (11.5 Singapore cents). 

For power-hungry data centres, a seemingly small 0.1-US cent difference in electricity prices can add up quickly: at a steady 10 MW IT load, it would shift annual energy costs by about US$131,000, before accounting for load growth.

A 2025 Schneider Electric report, citing data from the Energy Research Institute of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, said electricity accounts for about 57% of data-centre operating costs.

But national abundance does not guarantee that a data centre can obtain reliable electricity where and when it needs it. About 9% of China’s potential wind and solar generation went unused in the first half of 2026, according to the National Energy Administration. The industry term is curtailment: output that turbines and panels could have produced but was held back because the electricity system could not accommodate it.

Turning China’s energy resources into a computing advantage depends on the connections between its power plants, grids and server farms.

To deliver generated electricity to where it is needed, China is building a vast network of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines that carry power over long distances with relatively low losses. These lines connect energy-rich western regions with demand centres in the east, allowing coastal cities and their data centres to tap electricity generated thousands of kilometres away. The network already spans more than 50,000km – longer than the circumference of the earth.

China is poised to convert its comparative advantage in affordable, abundant electricity into a new stream of AI service exports. Overseas clients, chiefly across South-east Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – send requests via application programming interfaces (APIs) to data centres in China, where the computing is done before the results are sent back to them. 

Channelling energy from West to East

Just under an hour’s drive from central Guiyang city, under-construction apartment blocks lined the broad roads of Guian New Area alongside low-rise industrial buildings. Here in the mountainous Guizhou province, Huawei, Tencent, Apple and China’s three main telecoms operators have established data centres to serve customers far beyond the province.

At Huawei’s tightly guarded compound, elderly visitors and families with young children posed for photographs against pastel-coloured buildings, a clock tower and arched bridges. A waterfall roared at one end of the complex – part of a landscape that, according to Huawei, also helps dissipate heat from its computing equipment. 

Nearby, Tencent’s Seven-Star Data Center takes advantage of the naturally cool conditions inside a hillside.

The cluster embodies Beijing’s “East Data, West Computing” strategy: moving some of the processing and storage of data from the prosperous eastern seaboard to inland regions with more plentiful land and energy. Guizhou’s cool climate helps reduce the electricity needed to keep servers from overheating. The approach brings computing closer to power supplies, while creating a new industry for regions far from China’s coastal technology hubs.

The experiment has also drawn visitors from overseas. At a permanent exhibition in Guizhou devoted to the strategy, schoolchildren and organised groups were among the few visitors. 

A Tanzanian who works at a data centre in his home country was among those who visited in August. The engineer, who wanted to be known only as Abdul, was on a trip sponsored by China’s Ministry of Commerce. He said he wanted to see how China’s east-west approach worked and take useful ideas home.

For traditionally poorer and more remote provinces like Guizhou, the promise is that the data flowing west will bring opportunity with it – better infrastructure, new businesses and jobs that give young people a reason to stay rather than seek their fortune elsewhere.

Zhao Zehe, a 72-year-old retired insurance agent, said that while previously there was limited economic opportunity in the local area, now there was growing recognition that came with the data centre industry, which employs his nephew. 

“It’s good if it gives young people a reason to stay in Guiyang instead of moving away to bigger cities for work,” he told ST.

Launched in 2022, “East Data, West Computing” is organised around eight national computing hubs encompassing 10 data centre clusters across eastern and western China. By March 2026, these hubs accounted for more than 80% of China’s installed AI computing capacity, according to the National Data Administration.

China is also experimenting with ways to supply renewable electricity directly to data centres, cutting transmission losses and operating costs.

In Qingyang, in north-western China’s Gansu province, a pilot project pools electricity from wind and solar farms to supply data centres directly. According to local authorities, the arrangement has raised the park’s clean-energy share to 88% and lowered the electricity price users pay to about 0.40 yuan per kilowatt-hour.

Off Shanghai’s Lingang, an underwater data centre draws over 95% of its power directly from a nearby offshore wind farm. As an added benefit, it uses seawater for cooling, cutting energy consumption by more than a fifth compared with land-based counterparts.

Using brute compute to compete

Yet China’s electricity advantage comes up against a substantial gap in advanced processors. Nvidia’s cutting-edge processors are prized for their ability to handle the vast calculations needed to train and run sophisticated models. 

Nvidia’s appeal also rests on the software and networking built around its processors. Its CUDA platform provides tools that developers use to make their models run efficiently, while high-speed connections allow large numbers of chips to work together. Replacing Nvidia, therefore, means adapting software and rebuilding systems, as well as finding an alternative processor.

In response, Huawei says it has found a brute-force workaround to match Nvidia’s semiconductor dominance: glueing and folding its chips together. The Chinese national technology champion’s main approach is to build ever-larger computing systems. Instead of trying to match Nvidia chip for chip, Huawei connects hundreds of processors so they can work together as one giant computer.

Its flagship CloudMatrix 384 system, for example, links 384 Ascend 910C chips, compared with 72 GPUs in Nvidia’s GB200 NVL72 system. The sheer number gives Huawei an edge on some measures: CloudMatrix offers about 1.7 times as much raw computing power and 3.6 times the memory capacity. 

Getting hundreds of chips to work together efficiently is difficult because they need to exchange huge amounts of data without creating bottlenecks. Huawei tackles this with its own high-speed interconnect system, UnifiedBus, which lets data move between chips with very low delays and at speeds of up to 392 gigabytes per second.

Huawei is also experimenting with stacking chip components vertically, rather than placing them side by side. Its LogicFolding architecture puts active circuit layers face-to-face and connects them through tiny vertical links. This lets Huawei pack more computing power into the same space, even when it cannot make transistors much smaller. Early data suggests the technique can increase transistor density by 55% and improve energy efficiency by 41%.

Research group Epoch AI estimated in a September analysis that Nvidia’s B300 offered roughly seven times the theoretical computing performance of Huawei’s Ascend 950 series.

According to a transcript of an investor meeting circulating online, DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng acknowledged that Huawei still trails Nvidia at the individual-processor level: he said about four Huawei 950 cards are needed to match one of Nvidia’s latest high-end AI processors, a gap he put at roughly two years. But he said Huawei could make up for this by combining large numbers of chips into supernodes that can perform the same tasks as Nvidia’s latest systems.

However, this strength-in-numbers strategy has a major drawback: it uses far more electricity. Huawei’s CloudMatrix system draws about 560kW, nearly four times as much as Nvidia’s comparable system. 

Brookings Institution’s Chan said China remained constrained by overall production capacity for advanced semiconductors. 

“China is trying to overcome its chip disadvantage by building larger clusters of chips. However, China is still constrained by overall production capacity for advanced semiconductors. In addition, scaling up chip clusters may run into problems with speed and reliability,” he said.

How AI is like a ‘five-layer cake’

So, can China’s strength in electrons compensate for its weakness in silicon?

The jury is still out, said NTU’s Wen. In the near term, however, China may have an advantage, he told ST.

The US is struggling to add power quickly enough for its rapidly expanding AI data centres, with grid connections, transformers and other equipment becoming bottlenecks. Building new grid infrastructure can take five to 15 years.

“Energy is a key bottleneck for the United States in its data centre buildout. China, in contrast, is able to build new power generation rapidly, particularly renewable energy away from coastal regions,” Chan said.

“However, it would be a mistake to equate China’s ability to rapidly build energy capacity with a decisive advantage in compute buildout. China is still heavily bottlenecked on chips. Meanwhile, American AI accelerators are getting increasingly power efficient,” he added.

DeepSeek’s breakthrough in early 2025 and Moonshot AI’s Kimi K3 in July 2026 showed that Chinese companies can produce models that compete with some of the best from the US despite restrictions on their access to advanced chips. Kimi K3, for instance, was released as a 2.8 trillion-parameter, open-weight model whose performance approached leading US systems.

But strong models do not necessarily mean Chinese chips have caught up. DeepSeek, Moonshot and other Chinese AI firms have also been accused by US authorities and American AI companies of using distillation – training their models partly on the outputs of more advanced foreign models. China has rejected such accusations as unfounded and described distillation as a widely used industry technique.

For Wen, that makes China’s hardware gap difficult to pin down. “It’s hard to say how far Chinese chips lag behind,” he said. “Some semiconductor experts say two to three generations; some say just one to two.”

More fundamentally, he cautioned against thinking of electricity and chips as substitutes. Having more of one cannot simply make up for having less of the other.

He pointed to the recently-departed Nvidia chief Jensen Huang’s description of AI as a “five-layer cake”: energy at the bottom, followed by chips, infrastructure, models and applications. Each layer depends on the ones beneath it.

“Energy is the foundation,” Wen said. “Without energy, even if you have the chips, they are useless.”

luntian@sph.com.sg philipwen@sph.com.sg

Additional reporting by Michelle Ng

From Silicon Valley to Shenzhen, the battle for technological supremacy is being fought on a new frontier. The Straits Times’ correspondents go behind the algorithms to explore how geopolitics are reshaping the global AI race. Read more about China’s open-source models at  https://str.sg/tzbDw

Its vast power buildout could help bridge the “electron gap”. The Straits Times examines the imbalance and how it is reshaping the AI rivalry.

Friday, November 20, 2026

人生 - 无论遇到什么 -先处理心情 - 再处理事情。

深圳APEC期间,有三件事,连在一起看,颇有“深”意。

深圳APEC开启亚太合作新篇章
三里河 11-19 22:38
91万
专题   | 三里河

  深圳APEC期间,有三件事,连在一起看,颇有“深”意。

  其一,美国企业家马斯克选择来深圳,而在纽约同期的一场峰会则由他的数字分身代为出席。真人来华,本身就传递出重视中国市场的信号。在深圳,他又说了句大实话:“我是超级中国迷、科技迷。我常跟美国以及其他地区的人说,如果不亲自去一趟,你是无法真正了解中国的。”

  其二,“希望我的祖国也能有一个深圳”在海外火了,这座创新之城和未来之城“全妆”迎客,用硬实力和高颜值,让世界为之赞叹。

  其三,华强北市场一位女老板去年底开始制作“APEC相册”,恰在APEC会议周期间集齐最后一个经济体客商的合影。一本相册,折射深圳“朋友圈”的广度,也见证了中国对外开放的深度。

  11月18日至19日,亚太经合组织(APEC)第三十三次领导人非正式会议在深圳举行。这是中国第三次担任APEC东道主。

  2001 年上海,2014 年北京,2026 年深圳,三座城市,恰好对应中国经济的三大增长极:长三角、京津冀、粤港澳大湾区。

  三点相连,构成一个稳固三角,驱动中国经济高质量发展,也为世界注入稳定性与确定性。

  三次承办,恰与中国经济融入全球的进程同频共振,也见证了中国从融入者到贡献者的角色之变。

  2001 年的黄浦江畔,那一年,中国经济总量尚未突破10万亿元,排世界第六。APEC会议首次在中国举行,各经济体领导人一身唐装合影,达成《上海共识》。

  同年,中国正式加入世贸组织。渴望深入融入世界的东方巨龙,自此开始腾飞。

  2014 年的雁栖湖畔,中国经济总量突破63万亿元,稳居世界第二大经济体。APEC北京会议通过《亚太经合组织推动实现亚太自贸区北京路线图》,正式启动亚太自贸区进程。

  “一花不是春,孤雁难成行。”彼时的中国,已经有足够底气和伙伴们一道,推动亚太合作迈向新征程。

  2026 年的前海湾,作为亚太经济合作的倡导者、推动者、先行者,中国的经济总量已迈上140 万亿元的台阶,硬实力和软实力有目共睹。世界对这个和平稳定且越来越酷的国度的好感度,已超越美国。

  然而,如今的世界,单边主义、保护主义甚嚣尘上,APEC 被反复追问同一个问题:亚太怎么办?

  在深圳,中国给出方案:推动建设和衷共济、开放融通、开拓创新、包容发展的亚太共同体。

  事实上,中国一直在这么做,现在的中国不仅是“超级卖家”,以丰富优质的产品供给惠及全球;还是“超级买家”,作为全球第二大消费市场持续释放机遇;更是“超级实验室”,为创新提供广阔试验场。

  更重要的是,无论国际风云如何变幻,中国同世界各国合作共赢的决心都不会改变。

  聪明人自然会做出明智的选择。115家世界500强企业代表齐聚APEC工商领导人峰会,美国参会企业数量居外方经济体之首,便已说明,要合作不要脱钩,是人心所向。

  以开放纾发展之困,以创新聚增长之势,以合作谋共享之福。乘着太平洋的风,亚太合作期待像大鹏一样展翅高飞、鹏程万里。

  |总策划:俞岚

  |策划:周锐

  |统筹:王庆凯

  |执笔:李金磊

  |责编:程春雨

  |设计:黄蕾

  |“三里河”工作室出品

责任编辑:曲克

2283

CPF Hypothetical Case study: As a 75-year-old Singaporean, you can generally withdraw your CPF Ordinary Account (OA) savings - even if you have already accumulated about $300000 in your CPF Retirement Account (RA).

Yes. As a 75-year-old Singaporean, you can generally withdraw your CPF Ordinary Account (OA) savings, even if you have already accumulated about $300,000 in your CPF Retirement Account (RA).

Since you do not foresee needing the money in your OA, it is a reasonable question whether you should leave it there or withdraw it for greater flexibility.

However, CPF withdrawal rules at age 75 are slightly different from those for younger CPF members, and the amount you can withdraw depends on your CPF account circumstances.

### 1\. Can you withdraw your $300,000 OA?

CPF's rule for members aged 65 and above generally allows:

* If you have set aside your Full Retirement Sum (FRS): you can withdraw any amount from your OA.

* If you have not set aside the FRS: the amount you can withdraw is restricted, and some OA savings may be transferred to your RA to meet the required retirement sum.

Since you already have approximately $300,000 in your RA, you appear to have more than enough to meet the FRS applicable to your cohort. Therefore, you are likely eligible to withdraw your OA savings in full, subject to CPF's account assessment and the withdrawal application. Central Provident Fund +1

### 2\. Should you withdraw the money if you don't need it?

In your situation, I would not rush to withdraw the entire $300,000 simply because you are eligible.

You have two reasonable choices:
=====

Your OA earns 2.5% per annum, subject to CPF interest rules. CPF savings can also receive extra interest on eligible balances, depending on your age and account balances. Central Provident Fund +1

If you withdraw $300,000 and leave it in a bank account earning, say, 0.5% interest, you would earn approximately:

If you leave $300,000 in CPF OA at 2.5%

### $7,500 per year

Approximately $625 per month in interest

If you put $300,000 in a bank at 0.5%

### $1,500 per year

Approximately $125 per month in interest

Difference: approximately $6,000 a year in interest

This is a simplified illustration using the stated interest rates, before considering CPF extra interest, interest compounding, or changes in rates.

### 3\. What I would consider in your position

Since you are already 75 years old, and you have:

* $300,000 in CPF RA

* $300,000 in CPF OA

* No immediate need to use the OA money

I would seriously consider leaving the OA money in CPF for the time being, because:

* It earns relatively attractive interest without investment risk.

* You can withdraw it later if you need it.

* You don't need to worry about managing such a large sum of money in a bank or investing it.

* You retain the flexibility to withdraw some or all of it later.

CPF itself says that if you do not have an immediate need for cash, you may leave your withdrawable savings in CPF to earn interest and withdraw them when needed. Central Provident Fund +1

### 4\. My suggestion

You do not need to withdraw your $300,000 OA just because you are eligible to do so. You can leave it there and treat it as a reserve fund for your future needs.

At your age, having $300,000 earning CPF interest, safely and without needing to manage investments, is a valuable asset.

If you wish, you can also withdraw a smaller amount—perhaps $20,000 or $50,000—to keep in your bank for emergencies, while leaving the balance in CPF to earn interest.

You can verify your exact withdrawable amount through the CPF Retirement Dashboard:

[CPF official website](https://www.cpf.gov.sg/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

I would personally lean towards keeping the bulk of that $300,000 in OA rather than withdrawing it unnecessarily, unless you have a particular reason to take the money out.