Monday, August 31, 2026

India: Inside Beijing's mind: How China really sees India

Inside Beijing's mind: How China really sees India

The Economic Times

By Pallavi Aiyar

August 6, 2026

https://www.inkl.com/a/EkBPRGfWlBl

Beijing: Every communication encounter has an encoder, the speaker trying to convey something, and a decoder, the listener receiving it. Miscommunication happens when the message decoded isn't the one that was sent. India and China have this problem.

There is an undeniable structural asymmetry at the heart of the bilateral relationship. India and China do not think about each other with equivalent intensity. For China, India is a significant regional actor, a nuclear-armed neighbour, a potential irritant - but not a strategic equal. In contrast, China exerts gravitational force on strategic thinking in New Delhi. It is present in every military procurement decision, infrastructure project in the border regions, and calculation about Pakistan.

Also Read: India enters the story as China begins to rewrite the chips playbook

The asymmetry is not merely psychological. In 1990, India and China had broadly comparable per-capita incomes. By 2025, China's $19.4 tn GDP was nearly 5x India's $4.1 tn. As a participant in a recent conversation between Indian journalists and Chinese think-tankers in Beijing put it: India should accept its position of relative weakness without shame, and figure out how to leverage Chinese economic strength pragmatically. It was a reasonable argument. Indians in the closed-door gathering bristled. Pragmatism, encoded by the speaker, was decoded by his audience as condescension.

In the 2000s, Chinese perceptions of India were warm, and - unlike attitudes to Japan - organically so, not state-managed. Older Chinese remembered Raj Kapoor's socialist-era Awaara fondly. There was real respect for India as Buddhism's birthplace, and a kind of collegial regard for India's software outsourcing success, an area where India had outpaced China.

Today's younger Chinese carry less of that warmth and more of a coolly comparative gaze. The developmental gap has widened, and the register has shifted from potential peer to laggard-to-be-advised, or worse, presumptuous rival. Social media does the rest. Narendra Modi's unmet 2019 pledge of a $5 tn economy by 2024 is a recurring, mocking reference point whenever India's Vision 2047 comes up.

Some of this trolling curdles into something uglier, carrying a term most Indians have never heard: Ah San. Understanding it means going back to the treaty ports of late-19th and early-20th c. Shanghai, where Sikh policemen - recruited by the hundreds from Punjab from 1885 onward - made up a third of Shanghai Municipal Police.

Also Read: Despite swadeshi push, anti-dumping duties against Chinese firms crawl

They were cheaper than European officers and considered more reliable than local recruits, which slotted them into a colonial hierarchy as the enforcer's enforcer. Shanghainese called them 'hong tou Ah San' - red-headed number three: red for the turban, 3 for their rank beneath the British (No. 1) and Chinese (No. 2). The term hardened into shorthand for Indians generally, the willing instrument of the White man against fellow Asians.

Indian merchants had their own, less remembered role in this history. Parsi and Marwari traders were commercial intermediaries in the opium trade Britain forced on the Qing empire. By 1831, 41 Parsi merchants operated in Guangzhou's foreign enclave, outnumbering the English and Americans combined.

Marwari firms like Tarachand Ghanshyamdas traded opium futures across the Malwa belt. The fortune of Shiv Narain Birla, grandfather of Gandhi confidant G D Birla, has roots in that trade. Some of that same capital later helped fund India's independence movement. These merchants, junior partners in a system they didn't design, were neither innocent nor sovereign. But in China, the specifics faded while the residue stayed: the Sikh's red turban, the Parsi's opium chest, hardened into an instinct that India is the West's willing instrument.

That instinct still colours how Beijing reads Indian foreign policy today. The 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver, secured for India by George W Bush, wasn't read in Beijing as recognition of India's weight. It confirmed India had settled into the role of favoured American client. The Quad gets the same treatment. Where India encodes these as sovereign strategic choices, China decodes them, instinctively, as a reprise of the comprador reflex.

The misreading runs both ways. If China sees India through colonial subordination, India sees China through the lens of 1962 - the war that shattered Nehru's Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai idealism and left India, in its own telling, betrayed by a fellow postcolonial power it had trusted.

That wound still shapes how India reads Chinese moves today: Beijing's arming of Pakistan - visibly on display when Chinese-built J-10C fighters faced Indian jets in aerial engagements in May 2025 - reads in Delhi not as ordinary alliance politics but as deliberate encirclement, timed, it often feels, with pointed precision.

Neither side fully sees its blind spot. China looks at India and sees Ah San, repositioned for this century. India looks at China and sees 1962's smiling betrayer, advancing pawns beneath the table. In communication theory, the fix for a persistent encoding failure isn't to speak louder. It's to learn the other side's implicit assumptions, not just their words. India and China talk past each other fluently, and with total conviction.

It is never easy for a person to sit with a story that contradicts the one they grew up on. For nations carrying a century's accumulated weight, it is harder still.

(This is an edited version of an article that was first published in Noema Magazine)

Sunday, August 30, 2026

中国：低分教师被迫站上“耻辱”-台四川官方公开道歉介入调查

四川凉山州雷波县8月26日举行2026年秋季教育行政会期间，安排了疑似所带班级期末考成绩不理想的教师上主席台，在标注“耻辱”二字的背景板前合影，台下还坐满参会人员。（互联网）

2026-08-30

联合早报

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低分教师被迫站上“耻辱”台

四川官方公开道歉介入调查

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　　（凉山综合讯）中国四川省凉山州雷波县在一场教育行政会议上，安排了疑似所带领班级期末考平均得分较低的教师上主席台，在标注“耻辱”二字的背景板前合影。照片在网络曝光后引起哗然后，县政府公开致歉并称将依据调查结果严肃处理。

　　澎湃新闻星期五（8月28日）引述中共雷波县委宣传部称，凉山州政府组织的联合调查组当天已抵达该县，正式启动调查程序。

　　雷波县政府当晚在致歉声明中称，雷波县2026年秋季教育行政会中出现不尊重教师的错误做法，给与会教师带来严重心理伤害，造成不良社会影响。

　　声明指出，政府对此深感内疚、深刻反思，诚恳接受批评意见；并已成立专项工作组进行全面调查，将依据调查结果，依法依规严肃处理。

　　凉山州教体局接受《潇湘晨报》采访时说，网传照片经核查属实，雷波县确实开了上述内部会议，会上也安排了该活动。不过，凉山州从未有过类似惩戒举措，也不允许这样做。目前正联系雷波县了解情况。

　　网传照片显示，在星期三的会议现场，20余名身着白衬衫、黑西裤的教师分批次被请上主席台合影。身后大屏幕分别打出“雷波县2025-2026学年初中期末考试平均成绩15分以下教师合影”及小学版同款字样（成绩为“30分以下”），两张图片正中均标注“耻辱”二字，台下坐满参会人员。

　　中国官媒央视网星期五对上述事件发表评论时说，雷波县的简单粗暴管理手段暴露出教育管理的“懒政”思维：成绩不好，全是老师的错；老师不行，就当众羞辱。

　　评论指出，雷波县2021年被确定为中国乡村振兴重点帮扶县，教育底子薄、基础弱是客观现实。把低分全部归咎于教师，让一线教师独自“背锅”，既不公平，也不科学。

China: Low-Scoring Teachers Forced to Stand on a “Shame” Platform

Low-Scoring Teachers Forced to Stand on a “Shame” Platform

Sichuan (China) Authorities Publicly Apologize and Launch Investigation

Translated by ChatGPT

Lianhe Zaobao

2026-08-29

(Liangshan [China] report) At an education administration meeting in Leibo County, Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province, China, teachers who were suspected of having led classes with relatively low average scores in the final examinations were arranged to stand on the platform and pose for group photographs in front of a backdrop bearing the word “shame.” After the photographs were posted online and caused an uproar, the county government publicly apologized and said it would deal seriously with those responsible based on the investigation findings.

The Paper on Friday (August 28) quoted the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China’s Leibo County Committee as saying that a joint investigation team organized by the Liangshan prefectural government had arrived in the county that day and formally begun the investigation.

In an apology statement issued that evening, the Leibo County government said that improper practices disrespecting teachers had occurred at Leibo County’s 2026 autumn education administration meeting, causing serious psychological harm to the teachers attending the meeting and creating a negative social impact.

The statement said the government felt deeply remorseful and would reflect deeply on the matter, and sincerely accept criticisms. It had also established a special working group to conduct a comprehensive investigation and would, based on the findings, deal seriously with those responsible in accordance with the law and regulations.

The Liangshan Prefecture Education and Sports Bureau told Xiaoxiang Morning Herald in an interview that the photographs circulating online had been verified as authentic. Leibo County had indeed held the aforementioned internal meeting, and the activity had also been arranged at the meeting. However, Liangshan Prefecture had never adopted similar disciplinary measures and did not allow such practices. It was currently contacting Leibo County to understand the situation.

The photographs circulating online showed that at the meeting on Wednesday, more than 20 teachers dressed in white shirts and black trousers were invited onto the platform in batches to pose for group photographs. The large screen behind them displayed, respectively, the words “Group photograph of teachers whose average scores in the 2025-2026 academic year junior middle school final examinations in Leibo County were below 15 points,” and the same wording for primary schools, except that the score was “below 30 points.” The word “shame” was prominently displayed in the center of both photographs, while the seats below the platform were filled with meeting participants.

China’s state-run CCTV.com commented on the incident on Friday, saying that Leibo County’s crude and heavy-handed management methods exposed a “lazy governance” mindset in education management: If the results are poor, it is all the teachers’ fault; if the teachers are inadequate, humiliate them publicly.

The commentary pointed out that Leibo County was designated in 2021 as one of China’s key counties receiving assistance for rural revitalization. Its weak educational foundation and basic conditions are objective realities. Blaming teachers entirely for low scores and making frontline teachers “take the blame” alone is neither fair nor scientific.

印度航空-淡马锡：着眼长期增长- 力挺新航押注印度航空 2026-08-30

淡马锡：

着眼长期增长

力挺新航押注印度航空

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联合早报

2026-08-30

　　新加坡航空公司（SIA）投资持续亏损的印度航空（Air India）引发市场质疑，新航大股东淡马锡强调，支持新航从长期角度看待这项投资，并认为进军印度市场是集团寻求长期增长的重要战略布局。

　　淡马锡投资组合发展联席总裁、生态系统赋能总裁张洁心星期六（8月29日）在淡马锡网站发布公开信指出，新航过去经历多个航空业周期，展现出纪律和韧性，并为长期增长做好准备。淡马锡作为新航股东，支持新航作出有利于长期增长和全球竞争力的战略决定。淡马锡持有新航50.41%股权。

　　张洁心写道，新航已提出投资第二个航空枢纽的目标，以取得新加坡以外的长期增长空间。印度是仅次于美国和中国的全球第三大航空运输市场，因此具备成为新航第二个枢纽的条件。

　　新航早在2013年就通过与塔塔集团控股（Tata Sons）成立合资航空公司塔新航空（Vistara）参与印度市场。随着塔新航空在2024年11月并入印航，新航目前持有合并后集团25.1%的股权。

　　张洁心指出，新航投资印航让它进一步参与印度航空业的增长。不过，印航的大规模转型涉及复杂的运营和整合工作，是一项需要多年时间的工程，过程也不会是线性的。

　　她说，航空业的表现还受到飞机技术创新、机队更新周期，以及空域中断、地缘政治局势和燃油价格波动等外部因素影响，因此不应以短期表现判断这项投资的长期价值。 “虽然这类举措需要时间，但我们相信，它们对于维持长期增长至关重要。”

新航：参与印度市场增长

符合集团长期多枢纽战略

　　上星期彭博报道，印航正寻求两大股东塔塔集团和新航注资15亿美元（约19亿新元），以应对持续亏损的情况和推进转型计划。这消息引起市场关注和广泛辩论。

　　新航企业规划高级副总裁兼首席永续发展官利文芬星期六回复《联合早报》询问说，新航投资印航符合集团长期的多枢纽战略，让新航能够直接参与印度这个关键市场的增长。

　　她指出，印度是全球第三大航空客运市场，预计到2044年，航空客运量将较2024年增加约两倍。印度不断扩大的中产阶级、机场基础设施投资，以及航空公司大量采购飞机，都将推动航空市场增长。

　　利文芬强调，投资印航不仅让集团直接参与印度航空市场，也促进两家航空公司之间更深层次的商业合作，并加强新加坡和印度作为国际航空枢纽的互补作用。

　　目前，新航与印航的联营航班安排已覆盖20个国家和地区的61个航点；两家航空公司的常客计划及企业客户计划也进一步加强合作。

　　对于印航目前面对的经营挑战，新航承认，过去一年受到多重因素冲击，包括印航自2025年4月以来持续受到巴基斯坦关闭领空影响、2025年6月AI171航班事故、中东冲突导致重要市场受影响、印度卢比兑美元贬值，以及持续高企的燃油价格。

　　不过，新航认为印航在客户体验、机队更新、航线网络及营运表现方面已有实际进展。印航的净推荐值自2022年11月以来已提高超过70点；今年5月，印航取得Skytrax四星航空公司评级，旗下廉航印度快运航空（Air India Express）也获评四星低成本航空公司。

　　针对市场关注印航是否会要求股东进一步注资，利文芬说，印航的投资受到新航董事会全面关注。任何额外资本需求，都将根据集团严格的资本配置框架进行评估，包括考量印航的业务策略、新航集团营运现金流，以及购买新飞机和推出新产品所需的投资。

　　她强调，这种做法旨在支持集团的可持续增长，并为长期股东带来回报。

胡渊文　报道

新加坡建国精神历久弥新不易

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严孟达：建国精神历久弥新不易

https://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/story20260829-9586765?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app

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建国精神历久弥新不易

联合早报

2026-08-30

严孟达

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各族人口的“黄金比例”不是出自任何政治理论，而是源自新加坡的生存经验和地缘政治的考量.

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　　中国潮汕语影片《给阿嬷的情书》在亚洲华人圈子里引发的热潮，席卷新加坡，没有意外地出现于黄循财总理国庆群众大会的华语演说部分。

　　黄总理说他也看了，而且还是潮语原音版，不少人对总理“有时间去看”感到欣慰。总理日理万机、宵衣旰食，还拨出时间去看这部潮语片，显然他必须了解这部片子为何能够引发老一代华族新加坡人的感情共鸣，以及限制方言政策是否早已过时的相关议题。总理也被片中“做人要有情有义”这句话所感动。

　　总理带给国人一些令人兴奋的信息，讲方言的家庭已经很少了，现在的挑战是如何鼓励平时讲英语的华人，在日常生活中讲华语。方言既然不再被当作讲华语运动的“假想敌”，方言的使用空间，如电影和付费电视也跟着相应放松，但公共广播则继续使用华语。此外，华族宗乡会馆的方言活动也受到政府的更大肯定。

　　更重要的是，总理认为我们的社会、家长和学生都明白学习华语的重要，连一些传统英校也响应更多家长的要求，开办更多高华班。

　　教育部最近答复《联合早报》的问题时透露，从2021年以来的五年里，学生对华文语文特选课程的需求有所增加，参加计划的中学生从约150人增至今年近270人；参与的高一学生从约150人增至今年的200人。但是，单从数字来看，中学生对华文语特的兴趣并没有出现热潮。

　　目前开办华文语特的初院仅有五所，安德逊实龙岗初级学院明年加入这个阵营。这个自1990年起推出的旨在培养双语人才的计划，也应赶搭时代顺风车。

　　一方面，政府不断重申新加坡人学习母语的重要性；另一方面，三大族群以母语作为家庭语言的情形却每况愈下，新加坡讲英语家庭增至六成。

　　对于新加坡社会逐渐走向单语化的发展趋势，总理感到忧虑。他说：“政府十分关注这个趋势，我们要保留我们的亚洲社会的本质，绝对不可以成为一个单语社会。”

　　鼓励各族新加坡人在日常生活中多使用母语，家庭的语言是理所当然的空间。今后讲华语运动也许该把重点转移到“华族家里多讲华语，少说英语”。

　　以新加坡人为主，保持各种族人口比例的人口结构，是总理演说的另一重要课题。总理说，成为新加坡人从来不取决于血统，或你的家人最初来自哪里。新加坡要以审慎、可持续的步伐为公民人口注入新血。

　　随着新加坡对全球各个领域人才的吸引力持续加强，外地人才不断加入新加坡人的大家庭，随之而来的两个问题是，新加坡人在自己的国家会不会仍是主要人口，以及各族人口在公民人口中的比例，会不会因此而改变。

　　总理作出两个保证，一是新加坡会继续管控外来劳动力的规模，确保新加坡人仍是主要人口。

　　二是，公民人口的各族比例必须维持下去，总理说，目前的种族比例过去一直让新加坡受益良多，让每个社群安心，清楚自己的地位、代表性和发言权依然受到保障。

　　各族人口的“黄金比例”不是出自任何政治理论，而是源自新加坡的生存经验和地缘政治的考量。

　　欧洲与美国都为移民问题所困扰，移民问题若管控失当，进退失据，新加坡迟早要面对移民问题带来的政治后果。

　　最关键的是，新加坡维持以新加坡人为主的特色，人口的增长就不能单靠外来的“输血”，这个责任就落在新加坡人身上。

　　结婚生育的观念不振，是亚洲发达社会面对的共同问题。作为一个城市化人口小国，新加坡的问题尤其迫切。这次，总理就重塑新加坡人的婚姻与生育观，宣布一系列大刀阔斧的新措施，“要从根本上改变支持家庭的方式”。

　　多年来，政府鼓励生育的奖励效果不彰，也许从另一角度来看，如果没有过去的抢救工程，情况也许会更糟。

　　政府的新思路是，不再奖励生育，而是加码支持家庭应对不同育儿阶段的过程，如更多的在职家长育儿假、每个孩子从出生到17岁获得政府的补助达7万元。但是，政府一下子把这笔育儿援助成本摆清楚，难免有些“很会算”的年轻一代，可能反而不为所动。

　　养儿育女本来是个人的事，政府只是助一臂之力，在各个阶段帮助父母减轻育儿的压力，不也就是在鼓励年轻人“敢敢”结婚生孩子。其他亚洲国家，中国、日本和韩国以及香港和台北等城市，年轻人“买屋难”是个难解甚至是无解的障碍，但新加坡的组屋政策不是其他地方可以复制的。

　　当今时代，年轻人的婚姻观和生育观基本上是人生价值观的转变。新加坡的任何奖励与支持必须要有持久力、战斗力，以发挥潜移默化的效果。

　　黄总理年度重要演说，对眼下三大课题：双语政策、多元社会和人口结构，出台用心良苦的政策；对长远挑战，规划高度信心的战略。新加坡的发展不断受到内外因素的挑战，建国精神常在，历久弥新却不易。

严孟达

新加坡人消失中？

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韩咏梅：新加坡人消失中？

https://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/story20260829-9595463?utm_source=android-share&utm_medium=app

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新加坡人消失中？

联合早报

2026-08-30

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马斯克担心人类的消失，我想在那之前新加坡应该注意的是“新加坡人”不可以消失，未来即使这里仍然住着很多人，我们仍然要能够让一代又一代来到这里、出生在这里的人，很自然地说一句：我们是新加坡人。

=====

　　黄循财总理上星期天发表2026年国庆群众大会演说后，讨论最热烈的，是政府进一步加强育儿支持的一系列新举措。这个课题不只新加坡人讨论，国际上也颇受关注，连天天想着把人类送上火星的马斯克，也注意到了。

　　一个马斯克经常在X平台上互动的账户发贴文说，新加坡在生育率问题上全力出击，2025年的整体生育率已经降到创纪录的0.87。马斯克发了一句留言：Humans are disappearing（人类正在消失）。

　　这不是他第一次这么说。2024年底他也曾转发新加坡低生育率、劳动力减少的贴文，说新加坡以及许多其他国家，正走向灭绝。低生育率当然没有简单到“灭绝”的地步。不过，他这句话倒让我想到：如果新加坡人的下一代越来越少，真正应该担心失去的是什么？

　　政府能做的，首先当然是让生儿育女容易一点。钱和时间都是一部分，国家可以出钱补贴，但钱生不出孩子；时间也一样，每个人一天都只有24小时，政府可以用钱支付假期，但一个人休假以后留下来的工作，生不出另一个人做。

　　现在很多公司人力都卡得紧，员工多休几天育儿假，工作不会跟着放假，往往由同事分掉。政府可以补贴育儿假的工资，却补不了办公室里突然少掉的那个人。新加坡企业这些年一直讲精简人手，少一点人，多做一点事，听起来就是生产力。可是，我们现在一方面希望夫妻都工作，一方面又希望他们有时间生孩子、照顾孩子，企业的人力安排恐怕也得换一个想法。

　　这也许可以发展一种“替班经济”，兼职者、自由工作者、退休者，或希望减工时照顾家人的人，都是潜在的人力储备。经过基本培训，需要时进入企业补位。大公司可以有浮动团队，中小企业则可由行业共建人力池，配合跨岗培训，让人才留在劳动市场里。

　　在呼吁全社会一起亲家庭的同时，家庭本身也要亲社会。最近一起涉及儿童身体界限的风波，当然涉及个人边界，但我还是觉得，孩子需要保护，也需要在一个有人情味的社会里长大。家长如果把孩子抱得太紧，什么都不能碰、什么都不能靠近，最后养出来的可能是一个和社会保持距离的家庭。不亲社会的家庭，社会也很难真正亲他们。

　　政府把条件做好，至少可以让想生孩子的人少一点顾虑。可是再怎么努力，也不能假定，新加坡从此就会自己生出足够的下一代。所以总理接着谈新移民，是很现实的。

　　人口不够，可以靠移民补充。政府也可以通过移民政策，大致保持新加坡现有的族群结构。真正困难的问题，是一个人拿到新加坡护照以后，什么时候才开始觉得自己是“新加坡人”。

　　今天来到新加坡的新移民，和过去很多为了谋生南来的人很不一样。许多人受过良好教育，有专业、有文化和世界观，也有选择，未必非来新加坡不可。新加坡的工作机会、教育、治安和有效制度，都足以让人愿意留下来。可是留下来以后呢？

　　我们过去谈移民融入，比较多想到的是让新人了解新加坡、适应新加坡。这个当然需要。然而，一群已经有自己知识和文化经验的人，不会只是等待别人来告诉他应该怎样成为新加坡人。他们也需要在这个社会找到自己的位置，有表达的空间，有参与公共生活的机会。

　　实际上，今天的华社已经出现这样的变化。新移民在适应新加坡，原有的社会也因为他们的加入而改变。这个过程顺不顺利，在于能否形成新的共同生活。

　　不同地方来的移民会带来不同的文化、习惯和思想，新加坡本来就不是靠大家拥有同一种文化才组成的国家。到了关键的时候，我们知道自己的国家在哪里，也愿意和所有新加坡人一起承担这个国家的得失，我想这才是公民身份真正开始有了内容。

　　我特别留意总理宣布筹建的新加坡华族历史文化馆。新加坡其实已有不少类似展览，从原貌馆、华裔馆到文化中心常设展及各会馆资料，都从不同角度解释华族文化的形成。

　　新的展馆如果又从先辈南来、艰苦创业、会馆华校，一路讲到华人对国家的贡献，很容易变成大家已经看过的另一套展览。我希望它把重点放在一代又一代从不同地方来到这里的华人，后来怎么变成了新加坡人的过程。

　　早年的移民先认自己是潮州人、福建人、广东人、海南人，后来才有华侨、华人、马来亚人等身份想象，历经殖民、日据、自治、合并、分家、建国，对原乡的感情也曾经很深。到了今天，“我是新加坡人”已经成为很多人不需要思考就能说出来的一句话。这种转变，不是一张“红登记”或一本护照能反映的，真正的同胞情，要在人和人的相处中慢慢长出来，老新加坡人愿意把新人带进生活，新来的也愿意走进来。

　　因此，我希望新的华族历史文化馆，不只是告诉年轻人“这些是你们祖先的故事”。越来越多新加坡孩子的父母或祖父母，是这10年、20年才来到这里，百多年前南来的那批人未必是他们的祖先，可是那段历史仍然和他们有关，因为它告诉我们，新加坡一直在经历新人来到、落脚、磨合，最后慢慢成为自己人的过程。今天才来到这里的家庭，也正在经历同样的过程，也会给“新加坡华人”写下新的内容。

　　新来者不需要把以前的自己丢掉，也不能把这里当成一张白纸重写。这个社会已有自己的历史、多元种族共处的规则，和一些大家守住的东西。有一天，他们也会觉得，这个故事里有自己的一份，要接着写下去。

　　黄循财总理在谈科技转型时说了一句话，我想在人口问题上也合适：“我们以前做到了，今后还能再次做到。”

韩咏梅

Saturday, August 29, 2026

早安2026-08-29

关注自己 Focus on yourself

2026-08-29

转发：

不要把注意力放在别人身上；也不要把别人对你的评价当真。

关注自己的生活，关注自己的家庭，这与自不自私完全是两回事。

不要轻易给别人建议，与人相处要有边界感，满足感应该来自自己。

你家粗茶淡饭还是山珍海味，其实没人会真正关心，大家都在忙自己的日子。

别人嘴上说的，未必代表心里真正的想法，千万别当真。

Focus on yourself，不是自私，而是边界感。☕️

Friday, August 28, 2026

My Weight Statistics (2026-08-28) Ref. JN1 - Monthly Weight Measurement on the 28th of Each Month Since 28 May 2007.docx.

My 19-year Weight Management Records from 2007-05-28 to 2026-08-28 (by Calorie Restriction, i.e. Dietary Energy Restriction) (Ref. JN1):

Note: According to the Singapore Health Promotion Board, a Healthy BMI is greater than18.5 and less than 23.0. A BMI less than 18.5 would mean that the individual is at risk of nutrition deficiency diseases and osteoporosis.

A BMI equal or greater than 23.0 would mean that the individual is at risk of obesity-related diseases. (Ref: DD-Md2022J28)

As of 2026-08-28,

Note: ### indicates BMI = 23 or > 23

Total number of Monthly Weight monitored was 231 (100%)

The no. of times my healthy BMI between 18.5 and 22.9 was 226 (97.835%)

The no. of times my unhealthy BMI equal or more than 23.000 was 5 (2.165%)

=======================

2007

2007-05-28 morning, my weight = 65.0 kg, BMI = 23.588###

2007-06-28 morning, my weight = 61.0 kg, BMI = 22.136

2007-07-28 morning, my weight = 59.0 kg, BMI = 21.410

2007-08-28 morning, my weight = 58.7 kg, BMI = 21.302

2007-09-28 morning, my weight = 57.5 kg, BMI = 20.866

2007-10-28 morning, my weight = 57.5 kg, BMI = 20.866

2007-11-28 morning, my weight = 56.2 kg, BMI = 20.394

2007-12-28 morning, my weight = 55.5 kg, BMI = 20.140

2008

2008-01-28 morning, my weight = 54.8 kg, BMI = 19.886

2008-02-28 morning, my weight = 54.8 kg, BMI = 19.886

2008-03-28 morning, my weight = 54.5 kg, BMI = 19.777

2008-04-28 morning, my weight = 54.4 kg, BMI = 19.741

2008-05-28 morning, my weight = 54.1 kg, BMI = 19.632

2008-06-28 morning, my weight = 54.6 kg, BMI = 19.814

2008-07-28 morning, my weight = 54.5 kg, BMI = 19.777

2008-08-28 morning, my weight = 54.3 kg, BMI = 19.705

2008-09-28 morning, my weight = 54.9 kg, BMI = 19.923

2008-10-28 morning, my weight = 55.3 kg, BMI = 20.068

2008-11-28 morning, my weight = 54.5 kg, BMI = 19.777

2008-12-28 morning, my weight = 55.6 kg, BMI = 20.177

2009

2009-01-28 morning, my weight = 54.8 kg, BMI = 19.886

2009-02-28 morning, my weight = 55.9 kg, BMI = 20.285

2009-03-28 morning, my weight = 54.8 kg, BMI = 19.886

2009-04-28 morning, my weight = 55.3 kg, BMI = 20.068

2009-05-28 morning, my weight = 55.4 kg, BMI = 20.104.

2009-06-28 morning, my weight = 55.2 kg, BMI = 20.031

2009-07-28 morning, my weight = 55.1 kg, BMI = 19.995

2009-08-28 morning, my weight = 55.2 kg, BMI = 20.031

2009-09-28 morning, my weight = 56.3 kg, BMI = 20.431

2009-10-28 morning, my weight = 55.8 kg, BMI = 20.249

2009-11-28 morning, my weight = 56.2 kg, BMI = 20.394

2009-12-28 morning, my weight = 56.1 kg, BMI = 20.358

2010

2010-01-28 morning, my weight = 55.6 kg, BMI = 20.177

2010-02-28 morning, my weight = 56.5 kg, BMI = 20.503

2010-03-28 morning, my weight = 56.4 kg, BMI = 20.467

2010-04-28 morning, my weight = 55.7 kg, BMI = 20.213

2010-05-28 morning, my weight = 55.1 kg, BMI = 19.995

2010-06-28 morning, my weight = 56.4 kg, BMI = 20.467

2010-07-28 morning, my weight = 55.5 kg, BMI = 20.140

2010-08-28 morning, my weight = 55.8 kg, BMI = 20.249

2010-09-28 morning, my weight = 55.8 kg, BMI = 20.249

2010-10-28 morning, my weight = 55.4 kg, BMI = 20.104

2010-11-28 morning, my weight = 55.6 kg, BMI = 20.177

2010-12-28 morning, my weight = 55.5 kg, BMI = 20.140

2011

2011-01-28 morning, my weight = 55.4 kg, BMI = 20.104

2011-02-28 morning, my weight = 56.5 kg, BMI = 20.503

2011-03-28 morning, my weight = 55.6 kg, BMI = 20.177

2011-04-28 morning, my weight = 55.7 kg, BMI = 20.213

2011-05-28 morning, my weight = 55.6 kg, BMI = 20.177

2011-06-28 morning, my weight = 56.3 kg, BMI = 20.431

2011-07-28 morning, my weight = 56.5 kg, BMI = 20.503

2011-08-28 morning, my weight = 56.9 kg, BMI = 20.649

2011-09-28 morning, my weight = 56.2 kg, BMI = 20.394

2011-10-28 morning, my weight = 56.8 kg, BMI = 20.613

2011-11-28 morning, my weight = 59.0 kg, BMI = 21.410

2011-12-28 morning, my weight = 60.3 kg, BMI = 21.882

2012

2012-01-28 morning, my weight = 61.5 kg, BMI = 22.318

2012-02-28 morning, my weight = 62.7 kg, BMI = 22.753

2012-03-28 morning, my weight = 62.5 kg, BMI = 22.681

2012-04-28 morning, my weight = 61.3 kg, BMI = 22.246

2012-05-28 morning, my weight = 60.7 kg, BMI = 22.028

2012-06-28 morning, my weight = 60.6 kg, BMI = 21.992

2012-07-28 morning, my weight = 61.2 kg, BMI = 22.209

2012-08-28 morning, my weight = 60.8 kg, BMI = 22.064

2012-09-28 morning, my weight = 61.5 kg, BMI = 22.318**

2012-10-28 morning, my weight = 62.3 kg, BMI = 22.608

2012-11-28 morning, my weight = 63.4 kg, BMI = 23.008###

2012-12-28 morning, my weight = 62.9 kg, BMI = 22.826

2013

2013-01-28 morning, my weight = 63.0 kg, BMI = 22.863

2013-02-28 morning, my weight = 62.1 kg, BMI = 22.536

2013-03-28 morning, my weight = 61.5 kg, BMI = 22.318

2013-04-28 morning, my weight = 63.1 kg, BMI = 22.899****

2013-05-28 morning, my weight = 62.3 kg, BMI = 22.608

2013-06-28 morning, my weight = 62.2 kg, BMI = 22.572

2013-07-28 morning, my weight = 62.4 kg, BMI = 22.645

2013-08-28 morning, my weight = 62.6 kg BMI = 22.717

2013-09-28 morning, my weight = 62.4 kg BMI = 22.645**

2013-10-28 morning, my weight = 62.3 kg BMI = 22.609

2013-11-28 morning, my weight = 63.1 kg BMI = 22.899

2013-12-28 morning, my weight = 64.4 kg BMI = 23.371###

2014

2014-01-28 morning, my weight = 63.6 kg, BMI = 23.080###

2014-02-28 morning, my weight = 63.3 kg, BMI = 22.971

2014-03-28 morning, my weight = 62.7 kg, BMI = 22.753

2014-04-28 morning, my weight = 62.7 kg, BMI = 22.753

2014-05-28 morning, my weight = 62.9 kg, BMI = 22.826

2014-06-28 morning, my weight = 63.1 kg BMI = 22.899

2014-07-28 morning, my weight = 62.7 kg, BMI = 22.753

2014-08-28 morning, my weight = 62.2 kg, BMI = 22.572

2014-09-28 morning, my weight = 61.2 kg, BMI = 22.209

2014-10-28 morning, my weight = 61.4 kg, BMI = 22.282

2014-11-28 morning, my weight = 60.2 kg, BMI = 21.846

2014-12-28 morning, my weight = 60.8 kg, BMI = 22.064

2015

2015-01-28 morning, my weight = 61.3 kg, BMI = 22.246

2015-02-28 morning, my weight = 61.8 kg, BMI = 22.427

2015-03-28 morning, my weight = 61.8 kg, BMI = 22.427

2015-04-28 morning, my weight = 62,5. kg, BMI = 22.681

2015-05-28 morning, my weight = 62.4 kg, BMI = 22.645

2015-06-28 morning, my weight = 63.6 kg, BMI = 23.080###

2015-07-28 morning, my weight = 62.3 kg BMI = 22.609

2015-08-28 morning, my weight = 62.2 kg, BMI = 22.572

2015-09-28 morning, my weight = 63.0 kg, BMI = 22.863

2015-10-28 morning, my weight = 63.2 kg, BMI = 22.935

2015-11-28 morning, my weight = 62.6 kg, BMI = 22.717

2015-12-28 morning, my weight = 62.3 kg BMI = 22.609

2016

2016-01-28 morning, my weight = 63.0 kg, BMI = 22.863

2016-02-28 morning, my weight = 62.8 kg, BMI = 22.790

2016-03-28 morning, my weight = 62.0 kg, BMI = 22.499

2016-04-28 morning, my weight = 62.0 kg, BMI = 22.499

2016-05-28 morning, my weight = 62.4 kg, BMI = 22.645

2016-06-28 morning, my weight = 62.1 kg, BMI = 22.536

2016-07-28 morning, my weight = 62.2 kg, BMI = 22.572

2016-08-28 morning, my weight = 62.6 kg, BMI = 22.717

2016-09-28 morning, my weight = 62.8 kg, BMI = 22.790

2016-10-28 morning, my weight = 62,5. kg, BMI = 22.681

2016-11-28 morning, my weight = 62.1 kg, BMI = 22.536

2016-12-28 morning, my weight = 62.3 kg, BMI = 22.608

2017

2017-01-28 morning, my weight = 62.9 kg, BMI = 22.826

2017-02-28 morning, my weight = 62.4 kg, BMI = 22.644

2017-03-28 morning, my weight = 62.8 kg, BMI = 22.789

2017-04-28 morning, my weight = 62.3 kg, BMI = 22.609

2017-05-28 morning, my weight = 62.2 kg, BMI = 22.572

2017-06-28 morning, my weight = 62.6 kg, BMI = 22.717

2017-07-28 morning, my weight = 62.4 kg, BMI = 22.645

2017-08-28 morning, my weight = 61.9 kg, BMI = 22.463

2017-09-28 morning, my weight = 62.0 kg, BMI = 22.499

2017-10-28 morning, my weight = 62.0 kg, BMI = 22.499

2017-11-28 morning, my weight = 61.5 kg, BMI = 22.318

2017-12-28 morning, my weight = 61.5 kg, BMI = 22.318

2018

My Weight 2018-01-28 0934 hr 61.0 kg BMI 22.136

My Weight 2018-02-28 0915 hr 60.7 kg BMI 22.027

My Weight 2018-03-28 0620 hr 61.0 kg BMI 22.136

My Weight 2018-04-28 1005 hr 61.7 kg BMI 22.390

My Weight 2018-05-28 0856 hr 60.5 kg BMI 21.955

My Weight 2018-06-28 0600 hr 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2018-07-28 0600 hr 62.2 kg BMI 22.572

My Weight 2018-08-28 0720 hr 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2018-09-28 0805 hr 62.1 kg BMI 22.535

My Weight 2018-10-28 0750 hr 61.3 kg BMI 22.24

My Weight 2018-11-28 1000 hr 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2018-12-28 0650 hr 62.5 kg BMI 22.681

2019

2019-01-28 at 1000 hr 60.9 kg BMI 22.100

2019-02-28 at 0946 hr 61.0 kg BMI 22.136

2019-03-28 at 0700 hr 62.4 kg BMI 22.644

2019-04-28 at 0828 hr 62.9 kg BMI 22.826

2019-05-28 at 0745 hr 62.4 kg BMI 22.826

2019-06-28 at 0650 hr 62.4 kg BMI 22.644

2019-07-28 at 0736 hr 62.8 kg BMI 22.789

2019-08-28 at 0629 hr 62.4 kg BMI 22.644

2019-09-28 at 0644 hr 61.9 kg BMI 22.463

2019-10-28 at 0740 hr 62.5 kg BMI 22.681

2019-11-28 at 0632 hr 62.8 kg BMI 22.789

2019-12-28 at 0726 hr 62.5 kg BMI 22.681

2020

My Weight 2020-01-28 0625 HR 62.6 kg BMI 22.717

My Weight 2020-02-28 0728 HR 62.3 kg BMI 22.608

My Weight 2020-03-28 0649 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2020-04-28 0810 HR 62.0 kg BMI 22.499

My Weight 2020-05-28 0714 HR 62.3 kg BMI 22.608

My Weight 2020-06-28 0757 HR 60.2 kg BMI 21.846

My Weight 2020-07-28 0715 HR 61.6 kg BMI 22.354

My Weight 2020-08-28 0707 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

My Weight 2020-09-28 0609 HR 60.8 kg BMI 22.064

My Weight 2020-10-28 0818 HR 60.7 kg BMI 22.027

My Weight 2020-11-28 0706 HR 60.9 kg BMI 22.100

My Weight 2020-12-28 0631 HR 60.5 kg BMI 21.955

2021

My Weight 2021-01-28 0638 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2021-02-28 0741 HR 61.2 kg BMI 22.209

My Weight 2021-03-28 0659 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2021-04-28 0659 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

My Weight 2021-05-28 0618 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

My Weight 2021-06-28 0604 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2021-07-28 0642 HR 61.2 kg BMI 22.209

My Weight 2021-08-28 0653 HR 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2021-09-28 0618 HR 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2021-10-28 0549 HR 61.0 kg BMI 22.136

My Weight 2021-11-28 0630 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2021-12-28 0528 HR 61.6 kg BMI 22.354

======================================

2022

My Weight 2022-01-28 0910 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

My Weight 2022-02-28 0642 HR 61.2 kg BMI 22.209

My Weight 2022-03-28 0649 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2022-04-28 0649 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2022-05-28 0549 HR 61.0 kg BMI 22.136

My Weight 2022-06-28 0549 HR 61.0 kg BMI 22.136

My Weight 2022-07-28 0700 HR 60.6 kg BMI 21.991

My Weight 2022-08-28 0640 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2022-09-28 0738 HR 61.7 kg BMI 22.390

My Weight 2022-10-28 0708 HR 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2022-11-28 0706 HR 60.9 kg BMI 22.100

My Weight 2022-12-28 0722 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

========

2023

My Weight 2023-01-28 0537 HR 60.9 kg BMI 22.100

My Weight 2023-02-28 0515 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2023-03-28 0606 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2023-04-28 0738 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2023-05-28 0721 HR 61.0 kg BMI 22.136

My Weight 2023-06-28 0641 HR 61.2 kg BMI 22.209

My Weight 2023-07-28 0700 HR 60.9 kg BMI 22.100

My Weight 2023-08-28 0655 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2022-09-28 0738 HR 61.7 kg BMI 22.390

My Weight 2022-10-28 0708 HR 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2023-11-28 0612 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2023-12-28 0734HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

========

2024

My Weight 2024-01-28 0734 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2024-02-28 0510 HR 61.6 kg BMI 22.354

My Weight 2024-03-28 0642 HR 60.9 kg BMI 22.100

My Weight 2024-04-28 0721 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

My Weight 2024-05-28 0537 HR 61.3 kg BMI 22.245

My Weight 2024-06-28 0651 HR 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2024-07-28 0612 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2024-08-28 0747 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

My Weight 2024-09-28 0640 HR 61.1 kg BMI 22.173

My Weight 2024-10-28 0546 HR 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2024-11-28 0706 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2024-12-28 0649 HR 61.9 kg BMI 22.463

=======================================

2025

My Weight 2025-01-28 0625 HR 61.6 kg BMI 22.354

My Weight 2025-02-28 0742 HR 61.5 kg BMI 22.318

My Weight 2025-03-28 0640 HR 61.6 kg BMI 22.354

My Weight 2025-04-28 0734 HR 61.7 kg BMI 22.390

My Weight 2025-05-28 0738 HR 61.8 kg BMI 22.427

My Weight 2025-06-28 0606 HR 62.6 kg BMI 22.717

My Weight 2025-07-28 0757 HR 62.7 kg BMI 22.753

My Weight 2025-08-28 0546 HR 62.6 kg, BMI 22.717

My Weight 2025-09-28 0540 HR 62.2 kg BMI 22.572

My Weight 2025-10-28 0516 HR 62.4 kg BMI 22.644

My Weight 2025-11-28 0810 HR 62.1 kg BMI 22.535

My Weight 2025-12-28 0702 HR 62.2 kg BMI 22.572

=========================

2026

My Weight 2026-01-28 0733 HR 61.9 kg BMI 22.463

My Weight 2026-02-28 0649 HR 62.4 kg BMI 22.644

My Weight 2026-03-28 0511 HR 62.1 kg BMI 22.535

My Weight 2026-04-28 0523 HR 62.4 kg BMI 22.644

My Weight 2026-05-28 0521 HR 61.8 kg BMI 22.427

My Weight 2026-06-28 0821 HR 61.8 kg BMI 22.427

My Weight 2026-07-28 0739 HR 61.4 kg BMI 22.281

My Weight 2026-08-28 0525 HR 61.8 kg BMI 22.427

=========================

Note:

My current BMI is within the healthy range of 18.5 to 22.9.

For me, the range of healthy weight is 50.9786 kg (BMI = 18.5) to 63.10324 kg (BMI = 22.9).

People with BMI values of 23 kg/m2 (or 25 kg/m2 according to some sources) and above have been found to be at risk of developing heart disease and diabetes.

To be healthy, I must have a healthy weight.

Be as lean as possible without being underweight, as recommended by World Cancer Prevention Foundation, United Kingdom.

=================================

Note: On 2021-05-28, I removed the unimportant details of old records from My Weight Management Records.

=================================

Ref. WeightManagement

My Weight 2026-08-28

My Weight

2026-08-28

0525 HR

61.8 kg

BMI 22.427

Two nations of the exam

Voices : Two nations of the exam -

For subscribers only

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/two-nations-of-the-exam/

July 30, 2026

By Pallavi Aiyar

The Times of India

=====

The Nations of the Exam

By Pallavi Aiyar

In large countries with unruly demography— teeming and unequal—a viable social contract needs some way of promising equality of opportunity. India and China , the world’s two most populous nations, have converged on the same instrument: the competitive public exam. For all the anxiety, exhaustion and tragedy these examinations produce, for hundreds of millions of families they remain the one guaranteed shot at a better life.

The two countries are separated by the Himalayas but united by an organizing principle of family life: it is a parent’s duty to engineer the conditions under which a child can sit an exam, and a child’s duty to sit it. We are both nations of the Exam.

This year, exam season was a study in contrast.

In India, a leaked medical entrance paper voided the results of 2.27 million students and forced a re-sit. In the forty-six days between cancellation and re-examination, at least thirteen aspirants took their own lives. What followed was a youth-led movement that occupied the streets of cities across the country and has dented Prime Minister Modi’s hitherto invincible image.

I was watching from a few thousand kilometres north, in Beijing, where China was in the middle of its own exam season — the gaokao taken by aspiring university students is held every June and is the largest standardized test on earth. This year 13.35 million students took it.

The exam is designed centrally by the Ministry of Education and administered by the provinces. Every year the entire country briefly reorganizes itself around one task: making sure millions of school leavers answer the same questions under the same conditions, at the same moment. Exam papers travel and are stored like state secrets: GPS-tracked vehicles, police escort. Teachers who develop the exam questions are reportedly confined for about a month in secure facilities. The papers are often printed by high-security units where waste disposal and drainage systems are closely monitored to prevent leaks.

Exam halls run facial recognition, signal jammers, and blanket bans on phones and smartwatches. Since last year, China’s major AI firms have voluntarily throttled their own products during the exam window, disabling image recognition and real-time question-answering. Regulators, meanwhile, trawl social media for rumours of leaks and ads for cheating services.

My own, usually bustling, neighbourhood in central Beijing was hushed for the week of the gaokao. Construction paused. Car horns were discouraged. Traffic was rerouted to help exam takers arrive on time. Police ran shuttle services for stragglers; volunteers lined the roads with free rides, water, snacks.

This was the text message my telecom provider sent me in the run-up to the exam. (Screenshot below)

The machinery can seem almost absurdly elaborate until one understands what is actually being protected. The gaokao is more than an examination. It is the Chinese state’s most visible demonstration that career advancement is governed by meritocratic rules rather than by family background or political connections. In a country where inequality is immense, the examination is one of the few institutions that must be seen to be fair.

This is why the Party devotes such extraordinary attention to getting it right. Unlike in India, the Chinese Communist Party cannot renew its mandate through elections; instead, it renews it through demonstrations of competence. An orderly gaokao is one such demonstration. Every candidate who believes the rules are fairly enforced is, in a small way, a citizen who is persuaded that the state is delivering its side of China’s grand political bargain: we will govern effectively, you need not concern yourself with politics.

Few things threaten this bargain more than the suspicion that the country’s principal engine of social mobility has been rigged. The Party has never forgotten that China’s last great political crisis began with students. The protests of 1989 were not about the gaokao, but they remain a haunting reminder that when young people lose faith in a system, their grievances can quickly snowball, with dangerous consequences for those in power.

In India, the public examination system is in some ways even more fundamental than in China. The Chinese Communist Party inherited, and then transformed, a society riven with hierarchies, but the revolution provided a powerful levelling ideology: at least in principle, citizens entered the new state as equals. India inherited democracy without a comparable social revolution. Caste, religion, region and community remained load-bearing structures of social life. As a result, public examinations carry an even greater equalizing burden than in China.

India’s is a democracy of process more than delivery: elections are held on schedule, results are respected, and governments change hands peacefully. The machinery works. But process is not the same as accountability. For much of the country’s history, politics has been conducted less through demands for universal public goods than through claims made on behalf of sectarian communities — caste calculations, religious appeals and regional bargains. Citizens usually approach the state as members of a specific group, rather than simply as citizens entitled to equal treatment.

That is what makes this summer’s student protests so striking. Theirs have not been demands for a larger share of state resources, greater representation for a particular group, or a new entitlement. They’ve been demands that one institution, the examination system, function according to a universal rule: that every candidate, regardless of background, face the same test under the same conditions. It is a seemingly straightforward ask, but in India it carries unusual political weight. The demand for a fair exam is about much more than an exam. It is an insistence that the state treats citizens equally — and, in India, that is radical politics.

Thursday, August 27, 2026

Ah San 阿三

The following text is extracted from

Inside Beijing's mind: How China really sees India

https://www.inkl.com/a/EkBPRGfWlBl

=====

Inside Beijing's mind: How China really sees India

=====

Pallavi Aiyar is a territorially polygamous correspondent, columnist, and author. She has reported from — and raised a family in — China, Belgium, Japan, Indonesia and Spain. She writes about the world with indiscriminate delight and a weakness for the surprising connections between people and places.

=====

Inside Beijing's mind: How China really sees India

https://www.inkl.com/a/EkBPRGfWlBl

By Pallavi Aiyar

August 6, 2026

Also Read: India enters the story as China begins to rewrite the chips playbook

Also Read: Despite swadeshi push, anti-dumping duties against Chinese firms crawl

It is never easy for a person to sit with a story that contradicts the one they grew up on. For nations carrying a century's accumulated weight, it is harder still.

(This is an edited version of an article that was first published in Noema Magazine)

=====

陶朱公讲堂：SIA /Vistara的眼前困境

文/戴文雪

@27/8/26

新航折翼？

2026年，新加坡航空正经历一场严峻考验。刚交出近六年来首份季度亏损成绩单——截至6月底的2027财年第一季净亏7600万新元，昔日“航空业黄金标准”似乎暂失光芒。这场考验的核心，正是那个被寄予厚望却持续失血的战略棋子：印度航空。

战略初心：跳出“小红点”的宿命

新航与印航的渊源可追溯至本世纪初。2001年，新航曾与塔塔集团联手竞购印航股权，却因当地政治与工会阻力放弃。真正的突破始于2013年，新航与塔塔合资成立塔新航空（Vistara），以相对谨慎的方式扎根印度市场。

转折发生在2021年。当塔塔集团从印度政府手中接管连年亏损的印航时，邀请新航担任私有化顾问。彼时新航正深感“单枢纽模式”的脆弱，新冠疫情暴露了新加坡缺乏国内市场的致命伤，边境关闭意味着近乎全面停摆。而印度，这个全球增长最快的航空市场之一，提供了难得的战略纵深。

2024年11月，塔新航空（Vistara）正式并入印航，新航以注资及转让股权方式，持有合并后印航25.1%股份。新航总裁吴俊鹏明言，这笔投资让集团能直接进入印度国内市场并通过印度枢纽辐射国际，与新加坡枢纽互补，实现“单枢纽模式无法充分实现的增长机遇”。

现实困境：完美风暴下的巨额亏损

然而，战略愿景迅速被残酷现实吞噬。截至2026年3月底的财年，印航（含印度快运）录得23.3亿美元巨亏，较前一财年翻倍。新航承担的应占亏损达9.45亿新元，相当于集团全年净利近八成。在财年末，这项投资的账面价值已从20亿新元缩水至11亿。

亏损背后是一连串“完美风暴”：巴基斯坦关闭领空，迫使印航绕道增加成本；中东冲突推高燃油价格并扰乱航线；2025年6月的波音787空难（260人遇难）重创运营与声誉；全球供应链问题拖慢机队翻新；卢比贬值则令美元计价成本雪上加霜。

塔塔集团董事长陈哲（Natarajan Chandrasekaran ）坦言，扭亏过程“可能需要长达10年”。如今，印航据报正向两大股东寻求15亿美元注资，新航若按25.1%持股比例出资，需承担约3.76亿美元。

破局之道：可行方案

面对困局，新航并非束手无策。专家提出以下几个方向或可助其守住战略底线，同时控制财务风险：

第一，强化“以专业换权益”的谈判筹码。新航不仅是印航的重要股东，更拥有全球顶级的运营管理经验。目前集团总裁吴俊鹏已出任印航董事会非执行董事。新航可进一步争取在机队规划、收益管理、服务标准等核心环节的更大话语权，确保转型方向符合预期，而非被动承担亏损。

第二，分阶段注资，设定明确止损线。印航此次提出的15亿美元并非一次性到账。新航可坚持按进度分批出资，将每笔注资与可量化的运营改善指标（如客座率、准点率、成本削减进度）挂钩，一旦关键指标未达门槛，有权重新评估后续注资。

第三，加速协同效应变现。新航应推动印航与自身航线网络深度整合，在代码共享、常旅客计划、联合采购等方面挖掘收入协同。利用印度作为国际中转点的潜力，将印度客流引向新航的东南亚及亚太网络，使“多枢纽战略”真正落地而非停留在愿景。

第四，评估独立运营的退出路径。若中长期转型无明显起色，新航应考虑在适当时机出售部分或全部印航股权，即使折价退出，也优于无底洞式的持续注资。星展银行分析师预计印航“未来几年内不会实现盈利”，这一现实必须纳入董事会考量。

小結：

發展中國家的投資市場充斥風險与坑坑，尤其是在印度。但公司若不冒險，利從何來？

印度市场的战略价值毋庸置疑，但战略耐心不意味无限容忍。对以审慎著称的新航而言，这或许才是真正的考验：如何在不被“折翼”的前提下，等待这只印度巨鹰重新起飞。

完

Wednesday, August 26, 2026

xStar恭喜你的单次发评阅读量破500超越70%的用户

xStar

恭喜你的单次发评阅读量破500

超越70%的用户

今日头条

2026-08-26

2134 HR

法治社会,竟然有暴走...

于2026年8月14日发布

India: The painful incompetence of the Indian state

The painful incompetence of the Indian state

Taipei Times

Thu, Aug 06, 2026

By Devesh Kapur, professor of South Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

=====

The so-called ‘cockroach’ student movement against the government’s continued mishandling of national exams has exposed the nation’s systemic incompetence

=====

Recent student-led protests, which forced Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s typically unyielding regime to capitulate on key demands, dented Modi’s personal aura of power and exposed the limits of his government’s ability to curb dissent through heavy-handed repression. However, the protests also exposed a broader and more prosaic characteristic of the Indian state: incompetence.

The catalyst for the protests was a bungled exam process. In India — like in China, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam — students’ futures are decided largely by their performance on one exam. They spend years preparing for these high-stakes tests, which determine whether they gain entrance to one of a limited number of high-quality institutions of higher education or access to coveted government jobs.

Given the scarcity of university places, Indian students who can afford to head to universities abroad increasingly do so: In the past eight years, this figure has tripled, from about 450,000 in 2017 to 1.25 million last year. However, for lower-middle-class youth there are only a few ladders of social mobility, and university entrance exams are invariably the first rung.

=====

As stressful as the exams are, until recently they were conducted reasonably smoothly. In 2017, the growing number of exams (and students taking them) spurred the government to establish a centralized body, the National Testing Agency (NTA), to administer them. There was just one problem: The NTA’s capacity was never up to the job. While more than 10 million students take entrance exams in thousands of centers, hundreds of cities and more than a dozen languages each year, the NTA’s workforce is just 39 people, with a mere 24 in permanent posts.

The agency apparently believed that it could fill the gaps through outsourcing, but errors proliferated: paper leaks, postponed exams, mistakes in questions and delays in announcing exam results. Last year, a parliamentary committee said that the NTA’s performance had “not inspired much confidence.”

This year, allegations of a leak forced millions to retake a grueling medical entrance exam, and grading discrepancies emerged on a different exam. Against a backdrop of high youth unemployment and a gratuitous insult from a Supreme Court justice, students were outraged. They poured into the streets demanding the education minister’s resignation and broader education reform. When heavy-handed tactics failed to quell the movement, the government was forced to offer concessions — an unnerving outcome for Modi’s regime.

The problem extends beyond the NTA. India’s relatively weak state capacity, which lags significantly behind that of East Asian countries, has long hampered the economy’s development. Modi has been promising to address the problem since he came to power in 2014, but while his government’s emphasis on centralizing power and strengthening executive control has improved the “hardware” (infrastructure), it has come at the cost of deteriorating “software” (policies and institutions) — crucial for long-term development.

Improving the state’s bureaucratic machinery, including by attracting talented people, should have been a no-brainer, but by systematically prioritizing loyalty over competence, Modi’s government has inadvertently fostered risk aversion and mediocrity among senior bureaucrats. The fact that the government was caught off-guard by the frustration among India’s youth was not just a failure of discernment; it was an inevitable consequence of shutting out non-partisan sources of information.

Making matters worse, key officials are simply too old to grasp the dynamics of a rapidly changing world, let alone adapt to them. What limited policy changes have been undertaken have mostly been responses to external pressure, whether from US President Donald Trump or the growing threat from China.

Instead, Modi’s government has placed the highest priority on advancing narrow ideological objectives. For the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) — and its ideological parent, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) — controlling the education ministry is vital to propagate Hindutva (Hindu-nationalist) ideology. It is widely believed that academic appointments, from vice chancellors to faculty, must have the RSS’ blessing.

The Modi government has also throttled other essential levers for strengthening the state’s capabilities, from sub-national governments to civil society, mostly due to its deep mistrust and intolerance of anything it cannot control. Without “cooperative federalism,” India cannot meet the many pressing challenges it faces, whether in education, energy or the environment. However, under Modi, states have little authority. As a result, not even the issues that directly affect India’s political elite — such as severe air pollution in Delhi — get resolved.

Meanwhile, the government muzzles non-governmental organizations and think tanks if they dare to question its self-congratulatory messaging. This has impeded efforts to augment the state education system and redress the poor outcomes that have become standard for Indian schoolchildren, jeopardizing their futures and India’s development and prosperity. In addition, draconian laws governing foreign funding have undermined the philanthropic efforts of India’s well-heeled diaspora.

The Modi government has failed to strengthen even the agencies tasked with implementing its own priorities. In 2020, the government unveiled a forward-looking national education policy, aimed at transforming the education system to deliver universal high-quality education. Six years later, nearly two-thirds of staff positions at the country’s two principal higher-education regulators are vacant, stymieing progress.

Modi was propelled to power by popular frustration with the Congress-led government’s corruption and incompetence. However, 12 years later, his government’s record reflects the same pathologies. While the BJP felt untouchable earlier this year, following its unprecedented landslide victory in the West Bengal state elections, India’s young people have now offered it a somber reminder that a pendulum swings back at its apogee.

=====

Devesh Kapur, professor of South Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, is the co-author (with Arvind Subramanian) of A Sixth of Humanity: Independent India’s Development Odyssey.

本地人对新一代期待转变越发重视好奇心与创造力

本地人对新一代期待转变

越发重视好奇心与创造力

调查：“负责任”稳居榜首　“孝顺”排序下滑

联合早报

2026-08-26

林美玲　报道

调查显示，七年来，变化最大的是“好奇心”。2020年，只有6.7％的受访者认为这是孩子应具备的重要特质，今年这个比率增至23％，上升16.3个百分点。“创造力”的升幅紧随其后，从2020年的8.6％增至今年的23.2％，上升14.6个百分点。

　　本地人对于新一代应具备什么特质的期待正在改变。调查显示，过去七年，人们越来越重视孩子具备“好奇心”和“创造力”，尤其是重视“好奇心”的人增幅超过两倍；相形之下，更重视“礼貌”“孝顺”以及“尊重长辈”等传统价值观的人减少了。

　　不过，人们对“负责任”这个核心价值的重视依旧，七年来始终是最多人对新一代的期待；在最新调查中，47％的受访者选择了“责任感”，“同理心”第二，有36％。

　　由数码发展及新闻部设立的本地研究机构RySense星期二（8月25日）发布了有关的调查研究结果。这个调研综合分析了从2020年至2026年进行的多项调查。这些由RySense旗下网络平台HappyDot.sg负责的调查共访问了6821名年满15岁的新加坡居民，包括家长和非家长。每一年的受访者都会从同样的15个特质中，选出当今社会的孩子应具备的三项最重要特质。

　　这些特质是：负责任、礼貌、同理心、包容、尊重长辈与权威、勤奋、乐于助人、服从、坚持不懈、孝顺、虔诚、独立、创造力、好奇心和谦逊。

　　七年来，变化最大的是“好奇心”。2020年，只有6.7％的受访者认为这是孩子应具备的重要特质，今年这个比率增至23％，上升16.3个百分点。

　　“创造力”的升幅紧随其后，从2020年的8.6％增至今年的23.2％，上升14.6个百分点；人们对这两项特质的重视今年尤其显著。去年，重视好奇心和创造力的受访者还分别只有11％和8％，今年双双增至约23％。

　　RySense认为，这可能反映了一个更广泛的趋势，即环境变化日益加剧，人们越发重视适应能力和持续学习。人工智能（AI）的普及和应用迅速加深加广，也可能进一步加快这一转变，促使人们加紧在工作和生活中更积极地学习和采用新科技。

AI时代更须培养孩子

好奇心与不可取代品格

　　资深学前教育工作者、推广华文学习委员会（学前组）副组长林美莲博士受方时说，“负责任”和“同理心”连续多年稳居前二是好事，因为两者均为重要品格。

　　至于“尊重长辈与权威”和“孝顺”等传统价值观不再优先，林美莲认为，这可能与年轻一代的成长背景和生活环境不同于上一代有关，也因为这样，年轻一代对于这些价值观的理解和表达也有所不同。

　　“对这一代年轻人来说，尊重并不等于盲从。这并不表示他们不尊重长辈，而是他们不会盲目听从长辈的意见。”

　　林美莲认为，“创造力”和“好奇心”显著更受重视是可喜现象。在AI时代，培养孩子具备AI无法取代的能力更重要，而好奇心和创造力正是不可或缺的动力。

　　她指出，未来许多知识都能轻易通过AI获取，因此孩子更须具备好奇心，而不是单纯接受和复制AI提供的答案。“有好奇心，他就不会只是单一地去复制一个答案，而是会寻找更多答案，比较哪个才是正确的。”

　　她也强调社交能力的重要，因为这关系到孩子未来如何与他人沟通和合作。至于道德观和品格，如诚实、关怀和尊重等，这些同样是AI无法取代的品格，必须从小培养。

林美玲　报道

Local People's Expectations of the New Generation Are Changing-Increasingly Placing Greater Importance on Curiosity and Creativity

Local People's Expectations of the New Generation Are Changing

----

Increasingly Placing Greater Importance on Curiosity and Creativity

Survey: “Responsibility” Remains at the Top; “Filial Piety” Drops in Ranking

Translated by ChatGPT

Lianhe Zaobao

2026-08-26

Reported by Lim Mei Ling (林美玲）

A survey showed that over the past seven years, the biggest change has been in “curiosity”. In 2020, only 6.7 per cent of respondents considered this an important trait that children should possess. This year, the proportion increased to 23 per cent, an increase of 16.3 percentage points. “Creativity” followed closely, rising from 8.6 per cent in 2020 to 23.2 per cent this year, an increase of 14.6 percentage points.

Local people's expectations of what traits the new generation should possess are changing. The survey showed that over the past seven years, people have increasingly placed importance on children possessing “curiosity” and “creativity”, with the proportion of people who place importance on “curiosity” more than doubling. In contrast, fewer people place greater importance on traditional values such as “politeness”, “filial piety” and “respect for elders”.

However, people's emphasis on “responsibility”, a core value, remains unchanged. For seven consecutive years, it has been the trait most people expect the new generation to possess. In the latest survey, 47 per cent of respondents selected “a sense of responsibility”, while “empathy” came second, at 36 per cent.

RySense, a local research organisation established by the Ministry of Digital Development and Information, released the findings of the survey research on Tuesday (August 25). The study analysed multiple surveys conducted from 2020 to 2026. These surveys, conducted by RySense's online platform HappyDot.sg, interviewed 6,821 Singapore residents aged 15 and above, including parents and non-parents. Each year, respondents selected the three most important traits, from the same list of 15 traits, that children in today's society should possess.

The traits are: responsibility, politeness, empathy, inclusiveness, respect for elders and authority, diligence, helpfulness, obedience, perseverance, filial piety, piety, independence, creativity, curiosity and humility.

Over the past seven years, the biggest change has been in “curiosity”. In 2020, only 6.7 per cent of respondents considered this an important trait that children should possess. This year, the proportion increased to 23 per cent, an increase of 16.3 percentage points.

“Creativity” followed closely, rising from 8.6 per cent in 2020 to 23.2 per cent this year, an increase of 14.6 percentage points. People's emphasis on these two traits was particularly pronounced this year. Last year, only 11 per cent and 8 per cent of respondents respectively placed importance on curiosity and creativity; this year, both increased to about 23 per cent.

RySense believes that this may reflect a broader trend in which, as environmental changes intensify, people are placing increasing importance on adaptability and continuous learning. The rapid expansion and deepening application of artificial intelligence (AI) may also further accelerate this shift, prompting people to learn and adopt new technologies more actively in their work and daily lives.

In the AI Era, Children Need Even More Curiosity and Irreplaceable Qualities

Dr Connie Lum, a veteran early childhood education practitioner and deputy head of the preschool group of the Committee to Promote Chinese Language Learning, said that it is a positive development that “responsibility” and “empathy” have remained in the top two positions for many consecutive years, because both are important qualities.

As for traditional values such as “respect for elders and authority” and “filial piety” no longer being given priority, Dr Connie Lum believes this may be related to the fact that the younger generation has grown up in a different background and living environment from the previous generation. As a result, the younger generation's understanding and expression of these values are also different.

“For this generation of young people, respect does not mean blind obedience. This does not mean that they do not respect their elders, but rather that they will not blindly follow their elders' opinions.”

Dr Connie Lum believes that the significantly greater emphasis placed on “creativity” and “curiosity” is encouraging. In the AI era, it is more important to cultivate abilities in children that AI cannot replace, and curiosity and creativity are precisely indispensable driving forces.

She pointed out that in the future, much knowledge will be easily accessible through AI, so children will need to possess curiosity even more, rather than simply accepting and copying the answers provided by AI. “When he is curious, he will not simply copy one answer, but will look for more answers and compare which one is correct.”

She also emphasised the importance of social skills, because these affect how children will communicate and cooperate with others in the future. As for moral values and character, such as honesty, care and respect, these are likewise qualities that AI cannot replace and must be cultivated from a young age.

Lim Mei Ling

Reported by

Tuesday, August 25, 2026

An ‘Economic D-Day’ That Must Overcome a Troubled History

国际

新闻分析

特朗普试图扼杀伊朗经济，而这取决于中国是否合作

An ‘Economic D-Day’ That Must Overcome a Troubled History

DAVID E. SANGER

2026年8月25日

在周一宣布“经济弃儿行动”时，特朗普政府表示，该行动将切断所有向德黑兰输送资金的交易。 Doug Mills/The New York Times

In declaring a new “economic D-Day” for Iran on Monday, President Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent are reaching for yet another strategy to grope their way out of a military adventure gone wrong. Along the way they are reversing the usual approach to coercing adversaries to bend to American will.

周一，特朗普总统和财政部长斯科特·贝森特宣布对伊朗实施新的“经济D日”，再一次试图在一场失败的军事冒险中摸索脱身之法。与此同时，这也是对他们胁迫对手屈从美国意志的惯常手段的一次背离。

Ordinarily, Washington approaches a problem like dismantling Iran’s nuclear program with straightforward diplomacy. If that goes nowhere, officials mix in escalating economic sanctions, adding an element of coercion. Military action is a last resort, and only if the president determines that risking American lives is worth the possible benefit.

通常，华盛顿在处理像废止伊朗核计划这样的问题时，会先采用直截了当的外交途径。若外交无果，官员们便会逐步升级经济制裁，加入一层威胁的意味。军事行动是最后手段，且仅在总统认定让美国人冒生命危险可能带来足够收益时才会动用。

But Mr. Trump leaped from a brief round of diplomacy straight to bombing runs, meant to force the country to give up its stockpiles of 11 tons of enriched uranium — including a batch that was nearly bomb-ready — and perhaps collapse the government. The attacks failed at both objectives, at the cost of 18 American lives, hundreds or thousands of Iranians dead, and a price tag that independent analysts put at over $100 billion, though the Pentagon’s estimates are lower.

但特朗普在经过一段短暂的外交往来之后，直接跳到了轰炸这一步，意在迫使伊朗放弃其11吨浓缩铀储备——其中一部分接近武器级——也许还能推翻该国政府。这两项目标均未达成，却付出了18名美国人丧生、成百上千伊朗人死亡的代价，此外独立分析人士估算总花费超过1000亿美元，尽管五角大楼的估计没这么高。

And only now are Mr. Trump and Mr. Bessent trying one more grand experiment, named Operation Economic Outcast, that the White House described as “an unprecedented campaign to sever every remaining economic lifeline sustaining the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

直到现在，特朗普和贝森特才尝试又一项宏大试验，名为“经济弃儿行动”，白宫称其为“一场前所未有的运动，旨在切断维系伊朗伊斯兰共和国的每一条经济生命线”。

The plan is not implausible. As described by Mr. Bessent, it involves choking off every last transaction that funnels money to Tehran, whether it is well-disguised digital transactions, or ship-to-ship transfers of oil, or the movement of gold around the globe. “This is a sustained operation to collapse every last option for Iran,” Mr. Bessent, who has become the public face of the effort at economic strangulation said at a news conference at the Treasury on Monday.

该计划并非不切实际。正如贝森特所述，它涉及截断所有向德黑兰输送资金的交易，无论是有妥善伪装的数字交易、船对船的石油转运，还是全球范围内的黄金流动。贝森特周一在财政部新闻发布会上表示：“这是一项持续行动，旨在摧毁伊朗的所有选项。”他已成为这场经济扼杀行动的形象代言人。

But the effort raises a series of questions that the White House has not answered. First among them is why, if sanctions as airtight as these are possible, they were not employed before Mr. Trump ordered the U.S. military into battle, exposing shortages of key munitions and the limits of American military power? And now that the military has, in Mr. Bessent’s words, “laid the groundwork” for success, what about China — which purchased more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2025? Is the administration willing to risk another direct confrontation with Beijing, with which it is already at odds over artificial intelligence, Taiwan, a rapid nuclear expansion and a huge production overhang that threatens the global economy?

但此举引发了一系列白宫尚未回答的问题。首先，如果如此严密的制裁可行，为何不在特朗普命令美军开战之前采用？这场战斗暴露了关键弹药短缺和美国军力的局限。其次，既然军方已如贝森特所言“奠定了基础”，那么中国呢——2025年中国购买了伊朗超过80%的石油出口。美国政府是否愿意冒险与北京再次直接对抗？双方在人工智能、台湾问题、快速核扩张以及威胁全球经济的巨大产能过剩等方面已存在分歧。

The original D-Day, on the shores of Normandy, did not require Chinese participation. This economic D-Day does, and there is no indication so far that it is forthcoming, a month before President Xi Jinping is scheduled to arrive in Washington for his first state visit in more than a decade.

在诺曼底海岸上的原版D日并不需要中国参与。而这次经济D日需要，但目前没有任何迹象表明中国会配合，而此时距离中国国家主席习近平计划抵达华盛顿进行十多年来首次国事访问仅剩一个月。

“This will be tricky,” Peter Harrell, a visiting scholar at Georgetown Law School who has written extensively on the limits of economic sanctions, said on Monday.

“这将很棘手，”乔治城大学法学院访问学者彼得·哈雷尔周一表示，他就经济制裁的局限性写了大量文章。

上月在德黑兰塔吉里什集市附近。财政部长斯科特·贝森特已威胁对所有继续与伊朗做生意的国家实施所谓的“次级制裁”。 Arash Khamooshi/Polaris for The New York Times

Earlier this year, in deciding how to bring Iran to its knees, Mr. Trump “had a choice to really come down hard on the Chinese, which he didn’t want to do because of his own economic agenda with Xi, or put the naval blockade on the Iranian tankers,” Mr. Harrell noted.

哈雷尔指出，今年早些时候，在决定如何让伊朗屈服时，特朗普“曾有两个选择：一是真正对中国下重手施压，但由于他与习近平的经济议程，他不想这么做；二是对伊朗油轮实施海上封锁”。

“It turned out it was politically easier to put the blockade on all the Iranian tanks than to tell the Chinese ‘We will sanction your big companies’ if they continued their trade with Iran.”

“结果看来，对伊朗油轮实施封锁在政治上要比告诉中国‘再和伊朗贸易，我们就制裁你们的大公司’容易一些。

”

=====

It is still a delicate issue. Mr. Bessent threatened what are called “secondary sanctions” on all nations that continued to do business with Iran.

这仍是一个微妙问题。贝森特威胁对所有继续与伊朗做生意的国家实施所谓“次级制裁”。

But in an opinion article for The Financial Times over the weekend and at his news conference on Monday, Mr. Bessent never uttered the word “China.” He was going out of his way to avoid angering the world’s second-largest economy, and the one nation that may well determine whether this new White House strategy has a chance.

但在周末为《金融时报》撰写的评论文章以及周一的新闻发布会上，贝森特始终没有提及“中国”一词。他正刻意避免激怒世界第二大经济体，而中国恰恰是可能决定白宫这一新战略成败的国家。

Of course, there is nothing new in trying to make Iran an economic outcast. The first serious efforts to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program date back to the George W. Bush administration. When the Obama administration was trying to push Iran into negotiations in 2009, the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton, promised “crippling sanctions” unless the country entered negotiations.

当然，试图让伊朗成为经济弃儿并非新鲜事。最早真正动手对伊朗核计划实施制裁的是小布什政府。2009年奥巴马政府试图推动伊朗进行谈判时，时任国务卿希拉里·罗德姆·克林顿曾承诺，除非伊朗进入谈判，否则将实施“毁灭性制裁”。

It took years to generate results, but many experts contend that the escalating sanctions that followed helped compel Iran to agree to the 2015 nuclear accord, sharply limiting its nuclear work in return for a lifting of financial and oil sanctions. Mr. Trump ripped up that agreement in 2018, declaring it deeply flawed.

尽管花费数年才见成效，但许多专家认为，随后逐步升级的制裁有助于迫使伊朗同意2015年核协议，该协议大幅限制伊朗核活动，以换取金融和石油制裁的解除。特朗普于2018年撕毁该协议，宣称其存在严重缺陷。

At that time, he began reimposing sanctions, and he and his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, predicted that the economic pressure would be too much for Iran’s leaders to take.

那时，他开始重新实施制裁，他和时任国务卿迈克·庞皮欧预测，经济压力将让伊朗领导人难以承受。

“The Trump administration is pursuing a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign designed to choke off revenues that the regime — and particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, part of Iran’s military that is directly beholden to the Supreme Leader — uses to fund violence,’’ Mr. Pompeo wrote in Foreign Affairs in late 2018. “Yet President Trump does not want another long-term U.S. military engagement in the Middle East.”

“特朗普政府正在推行‘极限施压’，旨在切断该政权——特别是伊斯兰革命卫队（伊朗军队中直接听命于最高领袖的一部分）——用于资助暴力活动的收入，”庞皮欧于2018年底在《外交事务》中写道。“然而，特朗普总统不希望美国在中东再有长期军事介入。”

=====

Mr. Pompeo, now estranged from Mr. Trump, sounded many of the themes repeated by Mr. Bessent on Monday. The exception is that the United States is now committed to a military presence off Iran’s coast for an indeterminate amount of time, but certainly as long as Iran threatens shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

如今与特朗普疏远的庞皮欧当时提出的许多主题周一又被贝森特提及。不同之处在于，美国现在已在伊朗海岸外维持军事存在，且不知何时能结束——只要伊朗还在威胁霍尔木兹海峡航运，这种存在就会持续。

The record of these past sanctions is unimpressive: Iran kept shipping two million to three million barrels of oil a day despite them. Those numbers have now come down to a trickle, thanks to the naval blockade now in place.

此前的制裁成效上乏善可陈：伊朗仍每天出口200万至300万桶石油。如今，由于海上封锁，这个数字已经降到很低。

But the nuclear material has not moved out of its rubble-covered storage sites since the United States bombed those areas in June 2025, satellite photographs indicate. And the government survives, though under different management after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes of the war in February. His son, considered more of a hard-liner, now holds the post, even though he has not been seen or heard from directly.

但自2025年6月美国轰炸以来，卫星照片显示核材料并未从覆满瓦砾的储存设施移出。政府仍在运转，尽管在2月战争首轮袭击中阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊被击毙后，领导层已变更。现已继任的哈梅内伊之子被认为更为强硬，尽管他本人尚未公开露面或发声。

=====

贝森特周一在财政部。他已成为美国对伊朗的经济扼杀行动的形象代言人。 Julia Demaree Nikhinson/Associated Press

As a result, one of the more curious elements of Mr. Bessent’s speech on Monday came when he returned to a promise made by Mr. Trump nearly six months ago: that he would establish the conditions for regime change.

因此，贝森特周一讲话中格外奇怪的一点是，他重提了特朗普近六个月前的承诺：为政权更迭创造条件。

At the time, Mr. Trump thought the military battle would last a few days or weeks, before Iran offered what the president called “unconditional surrender.” He urged the Iranian people to rise up, and take over their government, after the smoke of the American bombing cleared. Mr. Trump soon abandoned that effort, acknowledging in an interview with The New York Times in June that the Iranian people simply did not have the guns or organization to make that happen.

当时，特朗普以为军事行动只会持续数天或数周，之后伊朗便会提出他所称的“无条件投降”。他敦促伊朗人民在美国轰炸的硝烟散去后奋起接管政府。但特朗普很快放弃了这一努力，在6月接受《纽约时报》采访时承认，伊朗人民根本没有武器或组织来实现这一目标。

Mr. Bessent tried a slightly different approach on Monday.

贝森特周一尝试了略有不同的方式。

===✓=

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“To the ordinary soldiers supporting this regime,” Mr. Bessent said, “as more and more of your paychecks stop or are supposedly just delayed, ask whether your commanders are leading your country to triumph or to ruin, and recall that the Berlin Wall fell when ordinary soldiers decided not to shoot at their own people.”

“致支持这个政权的普通士兵，”贝森特说，“当你们的薪水越来越多地停发或被告知只是延迟时，问问你们的指挥官，是带领国家走向胜利还是毁灭，并回想柏林墙倒塌之时，正是普通士兵决定不对自己人民开枪的时刻。”

Of course, the circumstances when the wall fell were entirely different than they are in Iran. There was no external, active war going on, just the accelerating pressure of the Cold War. And the Soviet Union and its satellites saw little hope in putting down the local uprisings, including the one in East Germany that led to Mr. Bessent’s historical analogy.

柏林墙的倒塌当然是和伊朗截然不同的情形。当时没有外部正在进行的热战，只有冷战加速的压力。苏联及其卫星国对镇压当地起义（包括促成了贝森特提及的柏林墙倒塌的那场东德起义）几乎不抱希望。

Yet that is Mr. Trump’s big bet right now. His decision in February to forgo the kind of sanctions announced on Monday, and to move right to military force, was in some ways an acknowledgment that economic sanctions move slowly, and that history suggests they often fail to work.

然而，这正是特朗普眼下的大赌注。他在2月决定放弃周一宣布的那种制裁，直接转向军事力量，在某种程度上是承认经济制裁见效缓慢，且历史表明它们往往失败。

Today, he is back to that plan, for absence of many other viable choices.

如今，由于缺乏其他可行选择，他又回到了这个计划。